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In the name of immigration control and national security, the United States has 
undertaken a massive project to build physical barriers along segments of the border between the 
United States and Mexico.  Unfortunately, the project also involves massive violations of human 
rights.  Although specific details about the project are hard to come by and vary daily, the United 
States claims that it will install 370 miles of border wall before the end of 2008.1  Over a 
hundred miles of wall will be built along the Texas/Mexico border.  The construction of the wall 
along the Texas/Mexico border will destroy important environmental resources, will involve the 
unfair and discriminatory taking of private property without a clear and fair process and will 
affect the means of subsistence and way of life of persons living in border communities, 
including the members of several indigenous groups.   
 
In response to this looming threat, a multi-disciplinary collective of faculty and students 
at the University of Texas at Austin formed to analyze the human rights impact of the 
construction of a border wall on the Texas/Mexico border.  This project is facilitated through the 
Rapoport Center for Human Rights and Justice at the University of Texas Law School and is 
supported by the University of Texas office of Thematic Initiatives and Community 
Engagement.  The Working Group includes faculty and students from the Geography 
Department, the Anthropology Department, the LBJ School of Public Affairs, the Teresa Lozano 
Long Institute of Latin American Studies and the Immigration Clinic, Environmental Clinic and 
Rapoport Center at the Law School.   The Working Group is collaborating with affected 
individual property owners, indigenous communities, environmental groups, Environmental 
Sciences faculty at the University of Texas at Brownsville and other academics and advocates to 
carry out work on this project.   
 
The Working Group has conducted extensive research and analysis of the legal, 
historical, property, environmental, indigenous, community and other impacts of the proposed 
border wall.  In addition, in early May 2008, a delegation of the Working Group travelled to the 
Rio Grande Valley area of the Texas/Mexico border to conduct fact finding regarding the impact 
of the border wall on human rights.  The group viewed some of the affected areas and properties 
along the border and met with:  property owners, including Dr. Eloisa Tamez and other residents 
in and near Brownsville as well as residents of the El Granjeno and Los Ebanos communities; 
officials at the Mexican Consulate in Brownsville, Texas; the President of the University of 
Texas at Brownsville and other faculty; student and community advocates involved in 
documenting the effects of the border wall; attorneys with Texas Rio Grande Legal Aid and 
faculty at the Colegio de la Frontera Norte in Matamoros, Mexico.   
 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper and the accompanying briefing papers submitted to the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, we use the terms “fence” and “wall” interchangeably to describe the 18-foot high reinforced barriers 
designed to halt pedestrian and vehicular passage, which are scheduled to be constructed on the Texas/Mexico 
border.  The statutes that mandate the construction of the barriers use the term “fence,” but the term “wall” is more 
commonly used by communities along the Texas/Mexico border and impacted property owners and provides an apt 
description.  Photographs of the types of structures to be built can be found at Congressional Research Service 
Report for Congress, Border Security:  Barriers Along the U.S. International Border 42 (May 13, 2008) [hereinafter 
CRS Barriers Report], attached as Exhibit 3 to this briefing paper. 
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The Working Group submits these briefing papers to the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (the “Commission”) with the request that the Commission consider the violations 
of human rights taking place through the construction of walls along the Texas/Mexico border.  
These briefing papers focus on the human rights impact of border wall construction on the 
Texas/Mexico border, although wall segments also have been and will be built along the border 
between Mexico and the states of California, New Mexico and Arizona.  These briefing papers 
focus on the Texas/Mexico border because: 1) the Working Group enjoys a unique connection to 
the residents of Texas and the Texas/Mexico border region; 2) the construction of border fencing 
in Texas presents issues involving the public taking of private land that are not present in the 
other states where the majority of property along the border is federal land; and 3) the next phase 
of border wall construction will take place predominantly in Texas.  The papers focus most 
heavily on the area along the Texas/Mexico border known as the Rio Grande Valley, which is 
located at the southernmost tip of Texas.  Much of the border wall construction planned for 
Texas is scheduled to take place in this area, and residents of this area were the first to contact 
the University of Texas regarding the severe impact that the border wall will have on their 
human rights.  The papers do nonetheless address border wall construction in other areas of 
Texas where important human rights issues are raised, particularly in relation to the indigenous 
communities that live in western Texas. 
 
History of the Border Wall   
 
 Historically, the United States and Mexico have not been separated by a physical wall or 
other barrier along most of the border.  Border bridges and official land crossing points have 
existed at irregular intervals to control and facilitate cross-border movement.  These entry points 
often include some limited fencing or wall in their immediate vicinity, but there has been no 
attempt until recent years to wall the border elsewhere.   This is not surprising, because the 
border between the United States and Mexico is approximately 2000 miles (3,100 kilometers) 
long, is irregular in its shape and passes through rough and difficult terrain.  From the southmost 
tip of Texas and the Gulf of Mexico, it follows the winding course of the Rio Grande River to the 
border crossing at El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua; westward from that area it 
crosses vast tracts of the Sonoran and Chihuahuan Desert and the Colorado River Delta; it goes 
westward from there to the San Diego and Tijuana border area before reaching the Pacific 
Ocean.2
 
In 1990, the United States government began to erect physical barriers along the border 
but only along a short stretch in the San Diego, California area.3  In 1996, Congress passed 
immigration legislation known as the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act (“IIRIRA”) which included in its provisions a grant of broad authority to the government to 
construct barriers along the border.4  This legislation also gave the government the power to take 
land, through condemnation proceedings if necessary, in the vicinity of the international land 
border when the government deems the land essential to “control and guard the boundaries and 
                                                 
2 International Boundary and Water Commission, United States Section, The International Boundary and Water 
Commission, Its Mission, Organization and Procedures for Solution of Boundary and Water Problems, available at:  
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/About_Us/About_Us.html. 
3CRS Barriers Report at 3. 
4 See IIRIRA, Pub.L. 104-208, Div. C, Section 102(a)-(c). 
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borders of the United States.”5  In 2005, Congress passed further legislation, known as the 
REAL ID Act which, among other things, authorized the Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) to waive all legal requirements to expedite the construction of 
border barriers.6   
 
Despite this legislation, the United States government did not undertake efforts to build 
barriers outside of the San Diego area.  Then, Congress passed the Secure Fence Act of 2006, 
which mandated that DHS construct fencing along five separate and specific stretches of the 
southern border, including several areas in Texas.7  The statute gave detailed parameters 
regarding the locations in which the wall was to be built, although it did not clarify the total 
mileage to be constructed under the law.  The legislation still did not envision a border wall 
along the entire southwest border but did provide significant new impetus for construction of a 
wall along significant segments of the border. 
 
Pursuant to the Secure Fence Act of 2006, the government constructed about 70 miles of 
wall along the Arizona/Mexico border in 2007.8  By late 2007, the government had turned its 
attention to the Texas/Mexico border and began plans to construct over 100 miles of wall along 
various stretches of that border by the end of 2008. 
 
As DHS began the process of surveying properties along the Texas/Mexico border to 
determine which land the government would seek to take for construction of the fence, Congress 
acted again on the border fence issue.  In December 2007, Congress amended the statute on 
construction of the border wall as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2008.9  The 
latest legislation, in a turnabout, orders DHS to construct at least 700 miles of fencing along the 
southern border of the United States but does not dictate where this fencing must be built.  
Instead, it leaves decisions regarding locations for the fence up to DHS.  The legislation does 
further mandate that 370 miles of the required 700 miles of fencing be constructed by the end of 
2008.  Importantly, the new law also requires consultation with those affected by the fence, 
providing that DHS “shall consult with . . . States, local governments, Indian tribes, and property 
owners in the United States to minimize the impact . . . for the communities and residents located 
near the sites [where] fencing is to be constructed.”10  The law also requires that DHS consider 
alternatives to physical fencing.  Despite the new authority for flexibility regarding the location 
of the wall and the absolute requirement of consultation, DHS has not altered its approach to the 
border fence in any significant way.  DHS has moved forward with its plans to put up expansive 
segments of wall along the Texas/Mexico border and has vowed to begin physical construction 
in the summer of 2008.11   
 
Border Wall Construction Process 
  
                                                 
5 See id., Section 102(d); 8 United States Code 1102(b). 
6 REAL ID, Pub.L. 109-13, Div. B. 
7 See Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub.L. 109-367, Section 3, attached as Exhibit 1 to this briefing paper. 
8 Associated Press, 70 Miles of New Border Fencing Almost Complete (Sept. 29, 2007). 
9 Pub.L. 110-161, Div. E, Section 564, attached as Exhibit 2 to this briefing paper. 
10 Id. (emphasis added). 
11 The Brownsville Herald, Border Wall Construction Slated to Begin by End of July (May 25, 2008). 
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The border construction process along the Texas/Mexico border, including the taking of 
land, has involved various stages and actors.  Border wall construction is the responsibility of 
DHS and specifically the sub-component of DHS entitled U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(“CBP”).  DHS began seeking temporary access to property along the Texas/Mexico border at 
the end of 2007 for the purpose of conducting surveys and mapping.  Although the access was 
temporary, it constituted a taking of land, because it required a temporary and partial 
relinquishment of land ownership rights to DHS.  Some property owners voluntarily granted 
access to their land, although many did so without full knowledge of the consequences to their 
property or their rights to demand compensation from the United States government for this use 
of their property.12  Others refused to grant access voluntarily.  DHS successfully sued 
approximately 60 of those property owners in condemnation proceedings in January and 
February 2008 to obtain the right to take the land for temporary access purposes.13  Those sued 
included individual property owners, city governments that own property, school districts and the 
University of Texas at Brownsville.  Once the government obtained access to land, voluntarily or 
through condemnation suits, CBP worked with the United States Army Corps of Engineers to 
conduct land surveys.14   
 
DHS is now entering into the next phase of the process.  Before it can actually construct 
border wall segments, it must obtain ownership of the property upon which it wishes to build.  
DHS, working with the United States Army Corps of Engineers, is currently making offers, 
mostly in the $4000-$10,000 range, for the purchase of land.15  If property owners do not 
voluntarily agree to sell portions of their land, DHS initiates condemnation lawsuits.  DHS filed 
about 50 such lawsuits in the month of May 2008 alone.16    DHS need only formally take the 
land upon which it actually plans to install the wall, often only a segment of the entire property.  
However, the wall will, in many cases, also deprive the owners of effective use of other parts of 
their property not purchased by DHS, because it will be difficult, if not impossible, to traverse 
the wall and reach property on the other side.   
 
Once DHS obtains title to lands along the Texas/Mexico border, construction of the wall 
can begin.  The government will contract out the work for the construction of the wall and has 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Working Group interview with Idalia Benavidez (May 2, 2008). 
13 See, e.g., United States of America v. 1.04 Acres of Land and Eloisa G. Tamez, Complaint in Condemnation, 
Case 1:08-cv-00044, filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas on May 28, 2008.  
We obtained the number of complaints by searching the federal courts’ publicly available electronic database known 
as PACER for all temporary condemnation actions filed at the beginning of 2008 by the United States in the United 
States District Courts for the Southern and Western Districts of Texas, which are the courts with jurisdiction over 
the targeted area.  
14 See CRS Barriers Report, at 20; Correspondence from the Forth Worth District of the United States Army Corps 
of Engineers to Dr. Eloisa Tamez seeking access to property to perform surveys and site evaluations (Dec. 7, 2007) 
(on file with the authors). 
15 See Working Group interview with Idalia Benavidez (May 2, 2008); United States of America v. 0.43 Acres of 
Land and Estate of Pilar Cabrera, Declaration of Taking, Case 1:08-cv-194, filed in the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Texas on May 28, 2008. 
16 See, e.g., United States of America v. 0.43 Acres of Land and Estate of Pilar Cabrera, Declaration of Taking, Case 
1:08-cv-194, filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas on May 28, 2008.  We 
obtained the number of complaints by searching the federal courts’ publicly available electronic database known as 
PACER for all recent condemnation actions filed by the United States in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas, which is the court with jurisdiction over the targeted area.  
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already begun to invite bids.17  Private companies will carry out this major government project 
for profit.   
 
On April 1, 2008, in the midst of significant opposition to the construction of the wall, 
DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff executed a waiver of 30 environmental and other laws pursuant 
to his authority granted by federal statute.18  In addition to key environmental laws such as the 
National Environmental Policy Act and the Endangered Species Act, Secretary Chertoff waived 
myriad other laws including, for example, the National Historic Preservation Act, the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act and the American Indian Religious Freedom 
Act.19  The waiver announcement lists numerous specific stretches of land along the Texas 
border with Mexico where the environmental and other laws will now be inapplicable.  This 
waiver thus allows construction on the Texas/Mexico border to move forward without 
compliance with the numerous procedural and substantive requirements that would otherwise 
apply to such an extensive project.   
 
The United States government has not been transparent in its plans for the wall along the 
Texas/Mexico border.  It has therefore been extremely difficult for the Working Group, and the 
public in general, to obtain concrete information regarding planned locations for the wall 
segments or even the total mileage that the wall will cover along the Texas/Mexico border.   
 
First, the United States government has not even been clear and specific about the total 
number of miles of wall that it plans to construct.  As noted above, the original Secure Fence Act 
of 2006 set out specific locations for fencing but did not specify the total mileage of fencing it 
mandated.  Calculations of the total mileage involved varied but suggested that the law required 
upward of 700 miles of wall, and at least one government report concluded that the law required 
850 miles of wall.20  The Secure Fence Act required construction of the wall in priority areas, 
amounting to over 300 miles, by the end of 2008.  The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
FY2008 requires at least 700 total miles of wall and mandates the construction of 370 miles of 
fencing by the end of 2008.  Finally, DHS Secretary Chertoff’s April 2008 waiver of 
environmental and other laws to allow for expedited construction applies to approximately 470-
490 miles of the border.21  It is unclear when those 490 miles of barriers are scheduled for 
construction.  The government has alternatively promised to construct 570 or 670 total miles of 
                                                 
17 Associated Press, “Army invites companies to bid on border fence work” (May 28, 2008); United States 
Government Accountability Office, Secure Border Initiative:  Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet Program 
Implementation 7 n.8, 12 (Oct. 24, 2007) [hereinafter GAO Secure Border Initiative Report], attached as Exhibit 4 
to this briefing paper. 
18 Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Secretary, Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, As Amended (April 1, 2008) [hereinafter DHS 
Waiver Determination]. 
19 Id. 
20 See CRS Barriers Report, at 10; Newsweek, Brownsville’s Bad Lie (April 26, 2008); The Texas Observer, Holes 
in the Wall (Feb. 18, 2008); Statement by Representative Bryan Conoway, Library of Congress Congressional 
Record, “Providing for Consideration of H.R. 6061, Secure Fence Act (Extension of Remarks), September 21, 2006.   
21 Department of Homeland Security, Statement of Secretary Michael Chertoff Regarding Exercise of Waiver 
Authority (April 1, 2008); The New York Times, Homeland Security Stands by its Fence graphic, available (May 
21, 2008). 
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barrier by the end of 2008.22  Those numbers lead to further confusion, though, because they 
include both pedestrian fencing and vehicle barriers that are not designed to prevent pedestrians 
from passing through the border. 23  The vehicle barriers will presumably not count toward the 
total mileage of reinforced fencing mandated in the statutes.  
 
Putting aside the government-created confusion regarding the number of miles of wall to 
be built, the best estimate of total construction of pedestrian fencing planned for the end of 2008 
is 370 miles, based on a review of various official statements.24  The remaining mileage to be 
constructed in 2008 corresponds to vehicle barriers.  As the government asserts that it has 
already constructed about 170 miles of pedestrian fencing, it appears that the government plans 
to construct another 200 miles before the end of the year.25  The waivers signed by the Secretary 
of DHS designating areas of construction suggest that approximately 130 miles of that new 
pedestrian fence will be constructed along the Texas/Mexico border with the longest segments 
placed in the Rio Grande Valley in the southernmost part of Texas.26
 
Second, despite the obvious importance of this information, it is also impossible to 
determine the exact properties and locations in which DHS plans to build the fence along the 
Texas/Mexico border.  DHS has published no comprehensive maps of planned construction.  
Selected maps displaying specific segments of the planned wall were originally available on a 
CBP website as part of the draft environmental impact statements the government prepared 
before the environmental laws were waived.  However, government officials repeatedly stated 
that those maps were outdated without providing newer maps.  The maps have now been 
removed from the website and are no longer available. 
 
On April 11, 2008, the Working Group filed a Freedom of Information Act request with 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and with CBP seeking, among other things, copies of all maps 
showing planned locations for the wall along the Texas/Mexico border.  More than six weeks 
later, we have not yet received the requested maps.   
 
This lack of transparency itself leads to serious concerns about the United States 
government’s commitment to guaranteeing human rights.  It also makes it more difficult to 
                                                 
22 See GAO Secure Border Initiative Report, at 7; DHS, Fact Sheet:  U.S. Department of Homeland Security Five-
Year Anniversary Progress and Priorities (March 6, 2008). 
23 See id. 
24 See GAO Secure Border Initiative Report, at 7; DHS, Fact Sheet:  U.S. Department of Homeland Security Five-
Year Anniversary Progress and Priorities (March 6, 2008); CRS Barriers Report, at 10. 
25 See DHS, Fact Sheet:  U.S. Department of Homeland Security Five-Year Anniversary Progress and Priorities 
(March 6, 2008).  It is worth noting that it seems unlikely that DHS will meet these goals.  To date, DHS only claims 
to have built 170 miles worth of pedestrian fencing.  Id.  About 80 miles of that construction were built before 2007 
and the implementation of the Secure Fence Act.  See GAO Secure Border Initiative Report, at 11.  In 2007, DHS 
built only about 75 miles of fence.  See id.  It is difficult to imagine how DHS will nonetheless build 200 miles of 
pedestrian fencing in 2008, particularly since the Government Accountability Office has concluded that DHS will 
face greater challenges than it has in the past in constructing fencing in 2008 on the Texas/Mexico border.  See id. at 
3.  Of course, the likelihood that DHS will not complete all planned miles by the end of 2008 does not ameliorate 
the severe impacts of the planned construction.  It simply makes it more difficult to know where DHS will start 
construction and how much it will achieve by the end of 2008, imposing additional uncertainty and stress on 
affected border residents. 
26 DHS Waiver Determination, Project Areas Attachment. 
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describe and analyze the specific human rights impact of the government’s border wall program.  
For purposes of the briefing papers, the Working Group relied on information about the planned 
locations for the border wall available from litigation documents filed against and by affected 
property owners, the testimony of individuals along the Texas/Mexico border who spoke with 
the Working Group, the original piecemeal draft environmental impact maps, the geographic 
locations identified in the DHS waivers of environmental and other laws, and press accounts.   
 
Several important and troubling aspects of the planned locations for construction of the 
border wall in Texas have nonetheless become clear from the information available.  As is 
described in detail in the briefing papers submitted by the Working Group, the wall is scheduled 
to be built through sensitive environmental areas, indigenous lands and small private properties 
but will not run through larger and more lucrative properties owned by businesses.  Some of the 
affected property, such as the land owned by Eloisa Tamez, has been held by families since the 
1700s when it was parceled out in land grants by the Spanish crown and has been guaranteed by 
successive governments and treaties, including the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.  The wall will 
be constructed on portions of the campus at the University of Texas at Brownsville, effectively 
dividing the campus into two segments.  It will also cut through sites of importance to the 
lengthy and unique history of the Texas/Mexico border, such as the United States National 
Historic Landmark site at Fort Brown and ancient cemeteries. 
 
The locations that DHS has selected for the fencing will have a devastating impact on the 
property of individuals who own land along the border.  Residents along the border will lose not 
only the segment of their properties upon which the wall is built27 but will also lose access to 
their property on the other side of the wall.  In the Rio Grande Valley, the wall will not closely 
follow the curving path of the river.  Rather, it will be built in straighter line segments, which 
roughly follow the path of levees previously built to protect against flooding.  As a result, large 
pieces of land along the river banks will be cut off by the wall. 28  Some stretches of fence will be 
built a mile inland from the river. In a few cases, individual homes or even entire plots of 
property will end up completely on the southern side of the wall.29  In many areas, the land is 
already partially disrupted by the existing levees.  However, rather than build on, immediately 
next to or on the river side of the existing levees, DHS plans to build another barrier away from 
the river side of the levees.  In other words, the wall will leave the levees and additional property 
on the side of the wall adjacent to the river, and the wall will not be passable at will like the 
levees.   
                                                 
27 Actually, DHS will take possession of the land on which the wall is built and additional land around the wall–
another 30 to 60 feet on each side. DHS, Environmental Impact Statement for Construction, Maintenance, and 
Operation of Tactical Infrastructure: Rio Grande Valley Sector, Texas (Draft) (2007). 
28 See The Washington Post, Border Fence Would Slice Through Private Land (Feb. 16, 2008) (highlighting several 
examples in which the wall will make large portions of land unavailable on the Mexico side of the fence; for one 
property, 25 of 80 acres of farmland would be left on the south side of the wall).     
29 The Brownsville Herald, Living on the wrong side of the fence (April 26, 2008) (quoting a specialist with the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers).  Some have suggested that the United States is essentially ceding territory to Mexico.  
Reuters, Texan Mayors Threaten Court to Stop Border Fence (Oct. 12, 2007) (quoting the mayor of Del Rio, Texas).  
While this suggestion is probably not technically correct, because the official border between the two countries will 
remain the same regardless of the placement of the wall, it raises important questions about control and sovereignty 




For many residents along the border, the inability to reach large portions of their property 
which abut the river will destroy their livelihood.  Many of these residents use these portions of 
their land to graze and water livestock, to irrigate crops, to enter the river for recreation and 
transportation and to fulfill other economic purposes.  To calm angry property owners, DHS has 
suggested that it might place gates or doors in the wall at some intervals.  However, it has not 
provided any specific plan for access to property on the other side of the wall.  It seems certain 
that gates, if they are installed, would be placed at some distance from one another, requiring 
residents to travel lengthy distances outside of their property to enter a gate and turn around to 
return to their property.  Obvious questions are also raised about the nature of the gates.  DHS 
has not explained how the gates will function or whether residents will be required to provide 
evidence of citizenship to travel around their communities or to enter and exit their own land.30   
 
Ineffectiveness of the Texas/Mexico Border Wall as an Immigration Control or Anti-
Terrorism Measure 
 
The stated goal of the border wall statutes is to protect and control the border by 
preventing unlawful entries by intending immigrants, terrorists or drug traffickers.31  While this 
goal is presumably lawful, as a matter of international human rights law, the construction of a 
border wall is not likely to be effective in achieving the objective.32
 
 The legislation cites the prevention of terrorism as an important goal of the border fence, 
and United States government officials repeatedly recite this refrain.  One Border Patrol official 
stated that the wall along the Texas/Mexico border was necessary to prevent the arrival of 
weapons of mass destruction.33
 
 However, government officials have provided no evidence that terrorists are using the 
Texas/Mexico border to enter the United States.  It has been well-established that the 9/11 
terrorists entered the country through legal immigration channels, and there have been no 
                                                 
30 See The Brownsville Herald, Living on the Wrong Side of the Fence (April 26, 2008) (including interviews with 
several landowners – one with property that will fall completely on the south side of the fence and one with land that 
will be split in half, leaving the property’s farmland on the other side of the fence--  who sought unsuccessfully for 
months to obtain assurances from DHS that they would have access to their land after the fence is built); Letter from 
the Department of the Army to Ms. Rita P. Taylor (April 4, 2008) (on file with the authors) (stating that roadways 
through the fence would allow access to her property and attaching a map that shows the roadways but does not 
show how they will connect with her property); Newsweek, Brownsville’s Bad Lie (April 26, 2008) (reflecting 
DHS’ response to questions about access to the golf course at the University of Texas at Brownsville, which will be 
left on the Mexico side of the wall, as suggesting that plans had not been made for access and that “options might 
include an electronic gate”); The New York Times, In Texas, Weighing Life with a Border Fence (indicating that 
DHS has told concerned local officials that “there would be some kind of gates through the fence, but what kind and 
where have yet to be specified”). 
31 See Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub.L. 109-367, Section 2; 8 United States Code 1102(b). 
32 The Working Group briefing paper on property rights and equal protection assesses at much greater length the 
failure of the border wall to meet the tests of proportionality and least restrictive measures applicable under 
international human rights law.  Here, we simply hope to analyze briefly the likely effectiveness of the border wall 
approach. 
33 YouTube, Brownsville Protests Border Wall, available at:  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GUMFfV_qbNM&feature=related. 
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credible reports that terrorists are now more inclined to sneak across land borders.34  If terrorists 
were to attempt to cross a land border illegally to enter the United States, it is more likely that 
they would cross into the United States from Canada, since there are fewer controls on the 
Canadian border.35  Because there is no evidence that terrorists seek to enter the United States 
through the Texas/Mexico border, the construction of a wall along that border will not be 
effective in preventing terrorism. 
 
 Nor will the construction of a wall along the Texas/Mexico border serve as an effective 
means of preventing or controlling unauthorized immigration.  According to official reports of 
the United States government, prior experiments with the border wall have proven ineffective.  
The original segment of border wall built in the San Diego area “did not have a discernible 
impact on the influx of unauthorized aliens coming across the border.”36   Attempted crossings 
and apprehensions in the San Diego area decreased only after additional steps were taken, 
including the dispatch of additional agents and resources, which did not rely on physical 
barriers.37  Even after the implementation of increased enforcement strategies in the San Diego 
area, the government has found “little impact” on overall attempted crossings into the United 
States and apprehensions.38  These government reports question the effectiveness of physical 
barriers as long as there are gaps in the border wall, because the physical barriers simply redirect 
attempted border crossings to areas in which there is no wall.39  There are no plans to build a 
solid border wall, and it seems unlikely (and undesirable as a human rights matter) that a solid 
border wall will ever be built given the length of the border between the United States and 
Mexico, the rough terrain it covers and the prohibitive cost.  The government has further noted 
that, while fences that channel immigration into more remote and rough terrain do not effectively 
deter immigration, they do lead to more migrant deaths.40   These analyses, by the United States 
government itself, suggest that the intermittent border wall to be built along the Texas/Mexico 
border will have little impact on overall unauthorized entries into the United States and will have 
a deadly effect on immigrants. 
 
 Physical barriers are also extremely susceptible to being breached and therefore are not 
reliable as a means of immigration control.  Official government reports note that “in the limited 
areas where fencing has been erected, there have been numerous breaches of the border fencing 
and a number of tunnels discovered crossing underneath he fencing.”41  DHS Secretary Michael 
                                                 
34 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Staff Statement No. 1:  Entry of the 9/11 
Hijackers into the United States 
35 Government Accountability Office, Border Security:  Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and Unmonitored 
U.S. Border Locations 1-2 (Sept. 27, 2007) (describing unmanned and unmonitored roads crossing the border 
between the United States and Canada and the ability of government investigators posing as unlawful border 
crossers to move freely along the Canada/U.S. border). 
36 See CRS Barriers Report, at 3 
37 Id. at 3, 13. The government uses numbers of apprehensions near the border as a proxy for number of attempted 
crossings and as a means of assessing the effectiveness of immigration control programs. 
38 Id. at 17. 
39 Id. at 32. 
40 Id. at 40 (“on average 200 migrants died each year in the early 1990s, compared with 472 migrant deaths in 
2005”). 
41 Id. at 32;  
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Chertoff has acknowledged that fencing is likely to breached and that tunnels have been built to 
get around it in some areas where it is already in place.42
 
 The United States government has all but recognized that a wall is an inadequate tool for 
stemming unauthorized border crossings.  DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff has acknowledged 
that physical barriers are largely symbolic and are not “a cure-all.”43  DHS has stated that it 
understands control of the border to require the “ability to consistently (1) detect illegal entries 
into the United States; (2) identify and classify these entries to determine the level of threat 
involved; (3) respond to these entries; and (4) bring events to a satisfactory law enforcement 
resolution.”44  Yet, the function of a wall is simply to put a physical halt, usually temporary, to 
an attempted border crossing and then make the crossing more difficult or deflect it elsewhere.  
The physical barrier does nothing to detect illegal entries or allow for categorization of the 
persons entering and does not respond to any entries through apprehension or other law 
enforcement resolution.  The interposition of a wall is a method that avoids actual contact 
between potential border crossers and United States government officials.  By its terms, it fails to 
fulfill the requirements of an effective system for border control as defined by the United States 
government itself. 
 
 The primary failure of the wall, though, is that it focuses on the physical border in the 
south of the United States as the crux of immigration control.  Yet, the reality of immigration and 
individual and government decision-making takes place in the interior of the United States, 
suggesting that the channeling of resources toward physical barriers along the border will be 
ineffective in addressing immigration issues.  Over half of the undocumented immigrants in the 
United States arrived legally by entering at an official land border or airport port of entry.45  
These immigrants later fell out of status or violated their status and joined the undocumented 
population.  In fact, statistical and anecdotal information suggests that unauthorized border 
crossings have decreased in the past several years along the Texas/Mexico border and 
elsewhere.46  This trend suggests that factors, such as the drooping economy and interior 
immigration enforcement actions, have had the greatest impact and that physical barriers are 
unnecessary and miss the target in addressing unauthorized immigration issues.   
 
 The core of the unauthorized immigration issue is the failure of the current United States 
immigration system to reflect the reality of global migration, to recognize the needs of United 
States employers and immigrant workers and to protect the human right of immigrant families to 
avoid separation.  Currently, the immigration system provides almost no route for hard-working 
immigrants to obtain lawful status.   The few immigrants wishing to work or rejoin their families 
                                                 
42 CNN, Chertoff to Hunter:  Border Fence “Overly Simplistic” (July 1, 2007); The New York Times, Homeland 
Security Stands by its Fence (May 21, 2008). 
43 The New York Times, Homeland Security Stands by its Fence. 
44 GAO Secure Border Initiative Report, at 4 n.3. 
45 Pew Hispanic Center, Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population (May 22, 2006). 
46 The New York Times, Homeland Security Stands by its Fence (May 21, 2008); The New York Times, A Natural 
Treasure that May End Up Without a Country (April 7, 2008) (quoting the manager of a nature reserve in the Rio 
Grande Valley as stating that he had seen a notable drop-off  in illegal crossings through the reserve in the last 
decade); see also Melissa del Bosque, The Texas Observer, Holes in the Wall:  Homeland Security Won’t Say why 
the Border Wall is Bypassing the Wealthy and Politically Connected (quoting a security official at the University of 
Texas at Brownsville as clarifying that unauthorized border crossers do not enter through the university campus).  
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in the United States, who are fortunate enough to qualify for lawful status, must wait for decades 
and are forced through expensive and inefficient immigration processing.  The system begs for 
unauthorized immigration to occur.  Yet, while immigration reform has been discussed in the last 
several sessions of Congress, no structural change has been forthcoming.  Until this system is 
changed, no physical border wall will allow the United States government to control and 
regularize immigration.   
 
The United States government estimates that each mile of border fence will cost 
approximately 2 to 4 million dollars.47  The total estimated cost of construction for the next 
planned 200 miles or so of pedestrian fencing to be completed by the end of this year is 
approximately $890 million.48  At this cost, it seems reasonable to expect an effective strategy 
for reaching the government’s goals regarding immigration control and the prevention of 
terrorism.  Instead, the proposed border wall is only likely to be effective in providing 
government officials with the political opportunity to say that they have accomplished something 
concrete, however ineffective. 
 
Widespread Opposition to the Texas/Mexico Border Wall 
 
The United States government’s plans to construct a border wall in Texas have generated 
widespread opposition.  The wall will cut through an area in which communities have always 
viewed themselves as cross-border and transnational in nature.  The ties between towns and 
residents north and south of the Rio Grande River are extremely strong, and residents on the 
border have traditionally traveled back and forth between Mexico and Texas regularly for social 
and economic purposes.  Many families include both Mexican and United States citizens with 
family members living on each side of the border and visiting each other regularly.49  Some 
border residents even maintain homes in both Mexico and Texas.50  Others travel back and forth 
daily to shop and conduct business.  Many residents along the Texas/Mexico border see the Rio 
Grande River “as a meeting point rather than a dividing line,” and they see the wall as an affront 
to the unique border identity and culture that has flourished in communities along both sides of 
the border.51  There is no doubt that the wall will disrupt the way of life, culture and economic 
viability of many communities along the border.   
 
Border residents and politicians have been largely united in their vocal opposition to the 
wall.52  The mayor of Eagle Pass, Texas has called the border “useless, expensive and potentially 
damaging.”53  The president of the University of Texas at Brownsville, Juliet Garcia, has noted 
                                                 
47 See CRS Barriers Report, at 27 (quoting the Congressional Budget Office); GAO Secure Border Initiative Report, 
at 12 (quoting CBP figures). 
48 GAO Secure Border Initiative Report, at 12. 
49 Newsweek, Brownsville’s Bad Lie. 
50 Current, Muro del odio:  People of the Forgotten River Grapple with the Border Wall (Feb. 27, 2008). 
51 Newsweek, Brownsville’s Bad Lie. 
52 See, e.g., AFP, Controversial Border Fence Hot Issue in Texas Primary (Feb. 25, 2008); Houston Chronicle, 
Hostile Reception for Pro-Fence Congressman in Brownsville (April 28, 2008); Los Angeles Times, A Town 
Against the Wall (Dec. 17, 2007) (“complaints are heard from El Paso to Brownsville, in river towns only a football 
field away from sister cities in Mexico, where the prevailing culture has long been bilingual and binational, and 
where everyone knows someone on the other side”); The Washington Times, Texas cities join suit against Mexico 
border fence (May 29, 2008). 
53 The Washington Times, Texas cities join suit against Mexico border fence (May 29, 2008). 
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that the proposed construction on the university’s campus of “an 18-foot high steel barrier 
between two friendly countries” would “destroy the campus climate.”54  Students and public 
school teachers have announced their opposition to the wall and have organized well-attended 
protest marches.  
 
Several lawsuits have been initiated against the United States challenging its actions in 
constructing the law.  Eloisa Tamez, a vocal property owner in opposition to the wall and the 
taking of her land, initiated class action litigation against DHS, asserting that the government had 
failed to properly consult with individuals and communities affected by the wall, to consider 
alternatives to the wall or to negotiate regarding the taking of land.55  A coalition of mayors from 
border towns and cities has now joined the litigation.56  Another lawsuit is currently pending 
before the United States Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the legislation that 
gave the Secretary of DHS authority to waive environmental and other standards and the 
Secretary’s exercise of that waiver.57   
 
The construction of the border wall has evoked ire internationally as well, particularly 
among otherwise friendly governments in Latin America.58  Mexico is obviously the country 
most affected by the construction of the wall.  The wall sends a message of antagonism rather 
than cooperation to Mexico and necessarily creates a negative impact on diplomatic relations 
between the two countries.  In addition, numerous treaties between the United States will likely 
be affected by the construction of the wall.  These treaties govern, for example, access to and 
control of the Rio Grande River and use of water as well as environmental protection along the 
border.59   
 
The Mexican government has made its opposition to the wall clear.  The government’s 
official position states:  “The government of Mexico reiterates its rejection of this [border wall] 
project, because it does not correspond to the climate of cooperation and joint responsibility that 
should exist between our countries, nor does it offer a solution to address effectively the 
problems that we share in the border area.”60  The Mexican government has received support 
from Canada and other member states of the Organization of American States for its objections 
                                                 
54 UTB/TSC, UTB/TSC Hosts Border Wall Subcommittee Meetings (April 28, 2008), available at 
blue.utb.edu/newsandinfo/BorderFence%20Issue/03_19_2008UpdatedBorderFenceInfo.htm. 
55 Tamez et al v. Chertoff et al, Complaint #08-CV-0555, filed in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas; Dallas Morning News, Rio Grande valley resident blocks seizure of her land for border fence 
(Feb. 7, 2008); Rio Grande Guardian, Tamez Sues Chertoff (Feb. 19, 2008). 
56 The Washington Times, Texas cities join suit against Mexico border fence (May 29, 2008). 
57 Rio Grande Guardian, South Texas Environmental Groups Sue DHS over Chertoff Waivers (May 29, 2008); 
Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, Case 07-1180, petition for writ of certiorari filed with the United States Supreme 
Court. 
58 Even President Mikhail Gorbachev, former leader of the Soviet Union, has expressed his opinion questioning the 
wisdom of the wall.  See YouTube, Gorbachev on the U.S./Mexico Border Wall, available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qGk2iec8v7Y. 
59 See, e.g., Boundary Treaty of 1970; Mexico and United States of America Agreement on Co-Operation for the 
Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area (Signed at La Paz, Baja California, on Aug. 14, 
1983);  Rio Grande Guardian, Marin:  18 Feet Concrete Levee Wall Would Violate Treaty with Mexico (April 21, 
2008); IPS, US-Mexico:  Border Wall Condemns Jaguars to Extinction (April 30, 2008). 
60 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Mexico, Communiqué 167, El gobierno de México protesto 
ante autoridades de EUA y gestiono la inmediata remoción de un tramo del muro fronterizo que se construyo en 
territorio Mexicano (June 25, 2007). 
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to the wall. In the fall of 2006, the Mexican government presented a declaration against the wall 
at the Organization of American States that received the support of 27 other countries and also 
obtained a resolution at the Summit of the Americas –an important gathering of heads of state 
from the region-- urging the United States to reconsider its decision to build a wall.61  In 
February 2008, representatives of the legislatures from Canada and Mexico, meeting in an inter-
parliamentary session, set forth an agreement in opposition to the border wall.62  The Chilean 
legislature sent its own formal protest in support of Mexico and against the wall to the United 
States government.63
 
Human Rights Impact of the Texas/Mexico Border Wall 
 
 The planned wall along the Texas/Mexico border not only engenders widespread 
opposition while remaining ineffective in fulfilling the government’s immigration control and 
anti-terrorism objectives, but also violates international human rights law.   The Working Group 
has analyzed and documented, in separate briefing papers accompanying this document, a series 
of human rights violations taking place as a result of the construction of segments of border wall 
along the Texas/Mexico border.  These human rights violations constitute breaches of the United 
States’ obligations under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, interpreted 
in light of the American Convention on Human Rights and other relevant international human 
rights norms.64  The briefing papers address the following issues: 
 
1. Violations of the right to property and equal protection guaranteed under international 
human rights law.  The United States government, in its implementation of plans to 
construct a wall along the Texas/Mexico border, has not acted rationally in attempting to 
build a wall that will deprive residents along the border of the right to hold and use their 
properties.  The government has failed to adopt proportional means of meeting its 
governmental goal of controlling the border, and the construction of a border wall, 
involving the taking of property, is not the least restrictive means of achieving 
governmental goals.  In addition, the government has not provided justification for its 
                                                 
61 International Herald Tribune, Mexico Gets Support of 27 Nations to Attack U.S. Plans for Border Fence in OAS; 
Special Communiqué of the XVI Summit of the Americas of Heads of State and Government Against the 
Construction of a Wall on the Mexico-United States Border (Nov. 2006), available at 
www.sre.gob.mx/dgomra/cibero/ibero4.htm. 
62 La Crónica, Interparlamentaria Mexico-Canada acuerda condena al muro fronterizo (Feb. 19, 2008). 
63 Proceso.com.mx, Condena el senado de Chile la construcción del muro en la frontera de EU con México (Jan. 2, 
2008), available at www.proceso.com.mx/noticia.html?sec=0&nta=56179. 
64 The American Declaration constitutes a source of international legal obligation for the United States as a member 
state of the Organization of American States. See I/A Court H.R., Advisory Opinion OC-10/89 Interpretation of the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, July 14, 1989, Ser. A Nº 10 (1989), paras. 35-45; I/A Comm. H.R., James Terry 
Roach and Jay Pinkerton v. United States, Case 9647, Res. 3/87, 22 September 1987, paras. 46-49.  According to the 
jurisprudence of the inter-American human rights system, the provisions of the American Declaration should be 
interpreted and applied in the context of ongoing developments in international human rights law and, specifically, 
in the light of the American Convention on Human Rights and other prevailing international and regional human 
rights instruments.  See,I/A Comm. H.R. Report Nº 52/01, Case 12.243, Juan Raul Garza (United States), paras. 88, 
89 (confirming that while the Commission does not apply the American Convention on Human Rights in relation to 
member states that have yet to ratify that treaty, the Convention’s provisions may well be relevant in informing an 
interpretation of the principles of the Declaration); I/A Comm. H.R., Report Nº 75/02, Case 11.140, Mary and Carrie 
Dann (United States), para. 127. 
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differential treatment of properties along the border as it has not explained why certain 
lucrative properties are not to be affected by border wall construction.  Statistical analysis 
suggests that the border wall and the necessary taking of property resulting from its 
construction will disproportionately impact poor Latino immigrant families.65 
 
2. Severe degradation of the environment and violations of the government’s human rights 
obligation to evaluate and take into account harm to the environment when undertaking 
public projects.  In its construction of a border wall, the United States government is 
bypassing numerous domestic laws designed to protect the environment and the people 
who utilize and enjoy it.  The negative impact of the wall on important and scarce natural 
resources, including the ocelot and other wildlife populations, plants and birds found 
along the Texas/Mexico border will be severe. The environmental degradation will cause 
significant harm to the residents of the Texas/Mexico border area who have traditionally 
held an important connection to the natural resources prevalent in the border area.66 
 
3. Violations of the rights of indigenous communities protected under international human 
rights law.  The wall will directly impact the lands of the Lipan Apache, Kickapoo and 
Tigua (Ysleta del Sur) indigenous communities living along the Texas/Mexico border.  
Yet, the United States government has proceeded forward in planning for the taking of 
portions of these lands without engaging in meaningful consultations with members of 
the affected indigenous communities.67 
 
The Working Group has endeavored to work expeditiously to provide the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights with this set of briefing papers, because the United States 
government is moving forward rapidly and aggressively with its plans to construct the border 
wall.  Each of the human rights issues we raise requires further analysis and development, and 
the Working Group plans to engage in continued work on the human rights violations caused by 




 Given the gravity of the human rights situation created by the construction of a border 
wall on the Texas/Mexico border, the Working Group respectfully requests that the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights immediately take notice of the issue and initiate an 
investigation.  We ask that the Commission publicly announce its serious concerns about the 
human rights violations related to the construction of the border fence during its 132nd period of 
sessions to be held in Washington, D.C. in July of 2008.  Finally, we request that the 
Commission set a general hearing on the border fence issue to be held during the 133rd period of 
sessions of the Commission scheduled to take place in Washington, D.C. in October of 2008. 
                                                 
65 Ariel Dulitzky, Denise Gilman & Leah Nedderman, Violations on the Part of the United States Government of the 
Right to Property and Non-Discrimination Held by Residents of the Texas Rio Grande Valley; Jeff G. Wilson, et al., 
An Analysis of Demographic Disparities Associated with the Proposed U.S.-Mexico Border Fence in Cameron 
County, Texas. 
66 Lindsay Eriksson & Melinda Taylor, The Environmental Impacts of the Border Wall Between Texas and Mexico. 
67 Zachary Hurwitz & Michelle Guzman, Violations on the Part of the United States Government of Indigenous 




One Hundred Ninth Congress
of the
United States of America 
AT THE SECOND SESSION 
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, 
the third day of January, two thousand and six 
An Act 
To establish operational control over the international land and maritime borders 
of the United States.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Secure Fence Act of 2006’’. 
SEC. 2. ACHIEVING OPERATIONAL CONTROL ON THE BORDER. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 18 months after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
shall take all actions the Secretary determines necessary and appro-
priate to achieve and maintain operational control over the entire 
international land and maritime borders of the United States, to 
include the following—
(1) systematic surveillance of the international land and 
maritime borders of the United States through more effective 
use of personnel and technology, such as unmanned aerial 
vehicles, ground-based sensors, satellites, radar coverage, and 
cameras; and 
(2) physical infrastructure enhancements to prevent unlaw-
ful entry by aliens into the United States and facilitate access 
to the international land and maritime borders by United States 
Customs and Border Protection, such as additional checkpoints, 
all weather access roads, and vehicle barriers. 
(b) OPERATIONAL CONTROL DEFINED.—In this section, the term 
‘‘operational control’’ means the prevention of all unlawful entries 
into the United States, including entries by terrorists, other unlaw-
ful aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics, and other contra-
band. 
(c) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall 
submit to Congress a report on the progress made toward achieving 
and maintaining operational control over the entire international 
land and maritime borders of the United States in accordance 
with this section. 
SEC. 3. CONSTRUCTION OF FENCING AND SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS 
IN BORDER AREA FROM PACIFIC OCEAN TO GULF OF 
MEXICO. 
Section 102(b) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–208; 8 U.S.C. 1103 
note) is amended—
H. R. 6061—2
(1) in the subsection heading by striking ‘‘NEAR SAN DIEGO, 
CALIFORNIA’’; and 
(2) by amending paragraph (1) to read as follows: 
‘‘(1) SECURITY FEATURES.—
‘‘(A) REINFORCED FENCING.—In carrying out subsection 
(a), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide for 
least 2 layers of reinforced fencing, the installation of addi-
tional physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sen-
sors—
‘‘(i) extending from 10 miles west of the Tecate, 
California, port of entry to 10 miles east of the Tecate, 
California, port of entry; 
‘‘(ii) extending from 10 miles west of the Calexico, 
California, port of entry to 5 miles east of the Douglas, 
Arizona, port of entry; 
‘‘(iii) extending from 5 miles west of the Columbus, 
New Mexico, port of entry to 10 miles east of El Paso, 
Texas; 
‘‘(iv) extending from 5 miles northwest of the Del 
Rio, Texas, port of entry to 5 miles southeast of the 
Eagle Pass, Texas, port of entry; and 
‘‘(v) extending 15 miles northwest of the Laredo, 
Texas, port of entry to the Brownsville, Texas, port 
of entry. 
‘‘(B) PRIORITY AREAS.—With respect to the border 
described—
‘‘(i) in subparagraph (A)(ii), the Secretary shall 
ensure that an interlocking surveillance camera system 
is installed along such area by May 30, 2007, and 
that fence construction is completed by May 30, 2008; 
and 
‘‘(ii) in subparagraph (A)(v), the Secretary shall 
ensure that fence construction from 15 miles northwest 
of the Laredo, Texas, port of entry to 15 southeast 
of the Laredo, Texas, port of entry is completed by 
December 31, 2008. 
‘‘(C) EXCEPTION.—If the topography of a specific area 
has an elevation grade that exceeds 10 percent, the Sec-
retary may use other means to secure such area, including 
the use of surveillance and barrier tools.’’. 
SEC. 4. NORTHERN BORDER STUDY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
conduct a study on the feasibility of a state of-the-art infrastructure 
security system along the northern international land and maritime 
border of the United States and shall include in the study—
(1) the necessity of implementing such a system; 
(2) the feasibility of implementing such a system; and 
(3) the economic impact implementing such a system will 
have along the northern border. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report that contains the 
results of the study conducted under subsection (a). 
H. R. 6061—3
SEC. 5. EVALUATION AND REPORT RELATING TO CUSTOMS AUTHORITY 
TO STOP CERTAIN FLEEING VEHICLES. 
(a) EVALUATION.—Not later than 30 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
shall—
(1) evaluate the authority of personnel of United States 
Customs and Border Protection to stop vehicles that enter 
the United States illegally and refuse to stop when ordered 
to do so by such personnel, compare such Customs authority 
with the authority of the Coast Guard to stop vessels under 
section 637 of title 14, United States Code, and make an assess-
ment as to whether such Customs authority should be 
expanded; 
(2) review the equipment and technology available to 
United States Customs and Border Protection personnel to 
stop vehicles described in paragraph (1) and make an assess-
ment as to whether or not better equipment or technology 
is available or should be developed; and 
(3) evaluate the training provided to United States Customs 
and Border Protection personnel to stop vehicles described in 
paragraph (1). 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report that contains the 
results of the evaluation conducted under subsection (a).
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Vice President of the United States and
President of the Senate.
H.R.2764 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both 
House and Senate) 
 
BORDER SECURITY FENCING, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND TECHNOLOGY 
For expenses for customs and border protection fencing, infrastructure, and 
technology, $1,225,000,000, to remain available until expended: Provided, That 
of the amount provided under this heading, $1,053,000,000 is designated as 
described in section 5 (in the matter preceding division A of this consolidated 
Act): Provided further, That of the amount provided under this heading, 
$650,000,000 shall not be obligated until the Committees on Appropriations of 
the Senate and the House of Representatives receive and approve a plan for 
expenditure, prepared by the Secretary of Homeland Security and submitted 
within 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, for a program to establish a 
security barrier along the borders of the United States of fencing and vehicle 
barriers, where practicable, and other forms of tactical infrastructure and 
technology, that includes: 
(1) a detailed accounting of the program's progress to date relative to 
system capabilities or services, system performance levels, mission 
benefits and outcomes, milestones, cost targets, program management 
capabilities, identification of the maximum investment (including lifecycle 
costs) required by the Secure Border Initiative network or any successor 
contract, and description of the methodology used to obtain these cost 
figures; 
(2) a description of how activities will further the objectives of the Secure 
Border Initiative, as defined in the Secure Border Initiative multi-year 
strategic plan, and how the plan allocates funding to the highest priority 
border security needs; 
(3) an explicit plan of action defining how all funds are to be obligated to 
meet future program commitments, with the planned expenditure of funds 
linked to the milestone-based delivery of specific capabilities, services, 
performance levels, mission benefits and outcomes, and program 
management capabilities; 
(4) an identification of staffing (including full-time equivalents, 
contractors, and detailees) requirements by activity; 
(5) a description of how the plan addresses security needs at the Northern 
Border and the ports of entry, including infrastructure, technology, design 
and operations requirements; 
(6) a report on costs incurred, the activities completed, and the progress 
made by the program in terms of obtaining operational control of the 
entire border of the United States; 
(7) a listing of all open Government Accountability Office and Office of 
Inspector General recommendations related to the program and the status 
of Department of Homeland Security actions to address the 
recommendations, including milestones to fully address them; 
(8) a certification by the Chief Procurement Officer of the Department that 
the program has been reviewed and approved in accordance with the 
investment management process of the Department, and that the process 
fulfills all capital planning and investment control requirements and 
reviews established by the Office of Management and Budget, including 
Circular A-11, part 7; 
(9) a certification by the Chief Information Officer of the Department that 
the system architecture of the program is sufficiently aligned with the 
information systems enterprise architecture of the Department to minimize 
future rework, including a description of all aspects of the architectures 
that were and were not assessed in making the alignment determination, 
the date of the alignment determination, and any known areas of 
misalignment along with the associated risks and corrective actions to 
address any such areas; 
(10) a certification by the Chief Procurement Officer of the Department 
that the plans for the program comply with the Federal acquisition rules, 
requirements, guidelines, and practices, and a description of the actions 
being taken to address areas of non-compliance, the risks associated with 
them along with any plans for addressing these risks, and the status of 
their implementation; 
(11) a certification by the Chief Information Officer of the Department 
that the program has a risk management process that regularly and 
proactively identifies, evaluates, mitigates, and monitors risks throughout 
the system life cycle and communicates high-risk conditions to U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection and Department of Homeland Security 
investment decision makers, as well as a listing of all the program's high 
risks and the status of efforts to address them; 
(12) a certification by the Chief Human Capital Officer of the Department 
that the human capital needs of the program are being strategically and 
proactively managed, and that current human capital capabilities are 
sufficient to execute the plans discussed in the report; 
(13) an analysis by the Secretary for each segment, defined as no more 
than 15 miles, of fencing or tactical infrastructure, of the selected 
approach compared to other, alternative means of achieving operational 
control; such analysis should include cost, level of operational control, 
possible unintended effects on communities, and other factors critical to 
the decision making process; 
(14) a certification by the Chief Procurement Officer of the Department of 
Homeland Security that procedures to prevent conflicts of interest between 
the prime integrator and major subcontractors are established and that the 
Secure Border Initiative Program Office has adequate staff and resources 
to effectively manage the Secure Border Initiative program, Secure Border 
Initiative network contract, and any related contracts, including the 
exercise of technical oversight, and a certification by the Chief 
Information Officer of the Department of Homeland Security that an 
independent verification and validation agent is currently under contract 
for the projects funded under this heading; and 
(15) is reviewed by the Government Accountability Office: 
Provided further, That the Secretary shall report to the Committees on 
Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives on program 
progress to date and specific objectives to be achieved through the award of 
current and remaining task orders planned for the balance of available 
appropriations: (1) at least 30 days prior to the award of any task order requiring 
an obligation of funds in excess of $100,000,000; and (2) prior to the award of a 
task order that would cause cumulative obligations of funds to exceed 50 percent 
of the total amount appropriated: Provided further, That of the funds provided 
under this heading, not more than $2,000,000 shall be used to reimburse the 
Defense Acquisition University for the costs of conducting a review of the Secure 
Border Initiative network contract and determining how and whether the 
Department is employing the best procurement practices: Provided further, That 
none of the funds under this heading may be obligated for any project or activity 
for which the Secretary has exercised waiver authority pursuant to section 102(c) 
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (8 
U.S.C. 1103 note) until 15 days have elapsed from the date of the publication of 
the decision in the Federal Register. 
 
 
SEC. 564. IMPROVEMENT OF BARRIERS AT BORDER. (a) Section 102 of 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (8 
U.S.C. 1103 note) is amended-- 
(1) in subsection (a), by striking `Attorney General, in consultation with 
the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization,' and inserting 
`Secretary of Homeland Security'; and 
(2) in subsection (b)-- 
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking `in the Border Area' and 
inserting `Along the Border'; 
(B) in paragraph (1)-- 
(i) in the heading, by striking `SECURITY FEATURES' 
and inserting `ADDITIONAL FENCING ALONG 
SOUTHWEST BORDER'; and 
(ii) by striking subparagraphs (A) through (C) and inserting 
the following: 
`(A) REINFORCED FENCING- In carrying out subsection (a), the 
Secretary of Homeland Security shall construct reinforced fencing 
along not less than 700 miles of the southwest border where 
fencing would be most practical and effective and provide for the 
installation of additional physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, 
and sensors to gain operational control of the southwest border. 
`(B) PRIORITY AREAS- In carrying out this section, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security shall-- 
`(i) identify the 370 miles, or other mileage determined by 
the Secretary, whose authority to determine other mileage 
shall expire on December 31, 2008, along the southwest 
border where fencing would be most practical and effective 
in deterring smugglers and aliens attempting to gain illegal 
entry into the United States; and 
`(ii) not later than December 31, 2008, complete 
construction of reinforced fencing along the miles 
identified under clause (i). 
`(C) CONSULTATION- 
`(i) IN GENERAL- In carrying out this section, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security shall consult with the 
Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, 
States, local governments, Indian tribes, and property 
owners in the United States to minimize the impact on the 
environment, culture, commerce, and quality of life for the 
communities and residents located near the sites at which 
such fencing is to be constructed. 
`(ii) SAVINGS PROVISION- Nothing in this subparagraph 
may be construed to-- 
`(I) create or negate any right of action for a State, 
local government, or other person or entity affected 
by this subsection; or 
`(II) affect the eminent domain laws of the United 
States or of any State. 
`(D) LIMITATION ON REQUIREMENTS- Notwithstanding 
subparagraph (A), nothing in this paragraph shall require the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to install fencing, physical 
barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors in a particular 
location along an international border of the United States, if the 
Secretary determines that the use or placement of such resources is 
not the most appropriate means to achieve and maintain 
operational control over the international border at such location.'; 
and 
(C) in paragraph (4), by striking `to carry out this subsection not to 
exceed $12,000,000' and inserting `such sums as may be necessary 
to carry out this subsection'. 
(b) No funds appropriated in this Act for U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
`Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology' may be obligated 
unless the Secretary of Homeland Security has complied with section 
102(b)(2)(C)(i) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996 (8 U.S.C. 1103 note) as amended by subsection (a)(2). 
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Barriers Along the U.S. International Border
Summary
Congress has repeatedly shown interest in examining and expanding the barriers
being  deployed along the U.S. international land border.  The 109th Congress passed
a number of laws affecting these barriers, and oversight of these laws and of the
construction process may be of interest to the 110th Congress.  The United States
Border Patrol (USBP) deploys fencing, which aims to impede the illegal entry of
individuals, and vehicle barriers, which aim to impede the illegal entry of vehicles
(but not individuals) along the border.  The USBP first began erecting barriers in
1990 to deter illegal entries and drug smuggling in its San Diego sector.  The ensuing
14 mile-long San Diego “primary fence” formed part of the USBP’s “Prevention
Through Deterrence” strategy, which called for reducing unauthorized migration by
placing agents and resources directly on the border along population centers in order
to deter would-be migrants from entering the country.  In 1996, Congress passed the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act which, among other
things, explicitly gave the Attorney General (now the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security) broad authority to construct barriers along the border and
authorized the construction of a secondary layer of fencing to buttress the completed
14 mile primary fence. Construction of the secondary fence stalled due to
environmental concerns raised by the California Coastal Commission.  In 2005,
Congress passed the REAL ID Act that authorized the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) to waive all legal requirements in order to expedite the
construction of border barriers.  DHS has announced it will use this waiver authority
to complete the San Diego fence.  The Secure Fence Act of 2006 directed DHS to
construct 850 miles of additional border fencing.  This requirement was subsequently
modified by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161), which was
enacted into law on December 26, 2007. The Act requires the Secretary of Homeland
Security to construct fencing along not less than 700 miles of the southwest border.
While the San Diego fence, combined with an increase in agents and other
resources in the USBP’s San Diego sector, has proven effective in reducing the
number of apprehensions made in that sector, there is considerable evidence that the
flow of illegal immigration has adapted to this enforcement posture and has shifted
to the more remote areas of the Arizona desert.  Nationally, the USBP made 1.2
million apprehensions in 1992 and again in 2004, suggesting that the increased
enforcement in San Diego sector has had little impact on overall apprehensions.  In
addition to border fencing, the USBP deploys both permanent and temporary vehicle
barriers to the border.  Temporary vehicle barriers are typically chained together and
can be moved to different locations at the USBP’s discretion.  Permanent vehicle
barriers are embedded in the ground and are meant to remain in one location. 
A number of policy issues concerning border barriers generally and fencing
specifically may be of interest to Congress, including, but not limited, to their
effectiveness, costs versus benefits, location, design, environmental impact, potential
diplomatic ramifications, and the costs of acquiring the land needed for construction.
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1 8 U.S.C. §1103 (a)(5).  Although the law still cites to the Attorney General, the authorities
granted by this section now appear to rest with the Secretary of DHS. See The Homeland
Security Act of 2002, P.L. 104-208, §§102(a), 441, 1512(d) and 1517 (references to the
Attorney General or Commissioner in statute and regulations are deemed to refer to the
Secretary of DHS).
2 For more information on the San Diego border fence, please refer to CRS Report RS22026,
Border Security: The San Diego Fence, by Blas Nuñez-Neto and Michael John Garcia.
3 For an expanded discussion of the USBP, please refer to CRS Report RL32562, Border
Security:  The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol, by Blas Nuñez-Neto.
Border Security: Barriers Along
the U.S. International Border
Background
Within the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) is charged with securing our
nation’s land and maritime borders between official ports of entry (POE) to deter and
interdict terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, and aliens attempting to enter the
country unlawfully.  In order to discharge its duties, the USBP deploys personnel,
technology, and tactical infrastructure such as vehicle barriers and fencing.  Fencing
is erected on the border to impede the illegal entry of unauthorized aliens, while
vehicle barriers are designed to impede the entry of vehicles but do not impede the
entry of individuals.  This report will analyze the barriers that are currently being
constructed and maintained along the border by the USBP, including historical and
future cost estimates and the policy issues involved.  Because the current debate has
largely focused on the deployment of fencing to the border, this report will focus on
the policy issues surrounding the construction of border fencing.  However,
information concerning the kinds of vehicle barriers being deployed at the border will
be provided where available.
Using the broad powers granted to the Attorney General (AG) to control and
guard the U.S. border,1 the USBP began erecting a barrier known as the “primary
fence” directly on the border in 1990 to deter illegal entries and drug smuggling in
its San Diego sector.2  The San Diego fence formed part of the USBP’s “Prevention
Through Deterrence” strategy,3 which called for reducing unauthorized migration by
placing agents and resources directly on the border along population centers in order
to deter would-be migrants from entering the country.  The San Diego primary fence
was completed in 1993, covering the first 14 miles of the border from the Pacific
Ocean.  The fence was constructed of 10-foot-high welded steel army surplus landing
CRS-2
4 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Border Control — Revised Strategy Is Showing
Some Positive Results, GAO/GGD-95-30, January 31, 1995.  (Hereafter referred to as GAO
Report 95-30.)
5 See P.L. 104-208, Div. C. IIRIRA was passed as part of the Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 1997.
6 P.L. 109-13.
7 From CBP Congressional Affairs, September 25, 2006.
mats4 with the assistance of the Corps of Engineers and the California National
Guard.  In addition to the 14 miles of primary fencing erected in its San Diego sector,
the USBP maintains stretches of primary fencing in several other sectors along the
southwest border, including Yuma, Tucson, El Centro, and El Paso.
In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which, among other things, explicitly gave the Attorney
General broad authority to construct barriers along the border and authorized the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to construct a secondary layer of
fencing to buttress the completed 14 mile primary fence.5  Construction of the
secondary fence stalled after 9.5 miles had been completed due to environmental
concerns raised by the California Coastal Commission (CCC).   In 2005, Congress
passed the REAL ID Act, which, among other things, authorized the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to waive all legal requirements to expedite
the construction of border barriers.6  In 2006, Congress passed the Secure Fence Act,
which, among other things, directed DHS to construct five separate stretches of
fencing along the southern border totaling 850 miles.7  This requirement was
modified by provisions in Division E of H.R. 2764, the Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161), which was enacted into law on December 26, 2007.  The
Secretary of Homeland Security is now required to construct reinforced fencing along
not less than 700 miles of the southwest border, in locations where fencing is deemed
most practical and effective.
In addition to border fencing, the USBP deploys both permanent and temporary
vehicle barriers at the border.  Vehicle barriers are meant to stop the entry of
vehicles, but not people, into the United States.  Temporary vehicle barriers are
typically chained together and can be moved to different locations at the USBP’s
discretion.  Permanent vehicle barriers are embedded in the ground and are meant to
remain in one location.  The USBP is currently erecting a 150 mile stretch of vehicle
barriers in conjunction with the National Park Service near Yuma, Arizona.
The San Diego Border Primary Fence
The USBP’s San Diego sector extends along the first 66 miles from the Pacific
Ocean of the international border with Mexico, and covers approximately 7,000
square miles of territory.   Located north of Tijuana and Tecate, Mexican cities with
a combined population of more than two million people, the sector features no
CRS-3
8 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Operation Gatekeeper: An
Investigation Into Allegations of Fraud and Misconduct, July 1998, available at
[http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/9807/gkp01.htm#P160_18689].
9 GAO Report 95-30.
10 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Operation Gatekeeper: An
Investigation Into Allegations of Fraud and Misconduct, July 1998, at [http://www.usdoj.
gov/oig/special/9807/index.htm].  (Hereafter referred to as DOJ-OIG Gatekeeper Report.)
11 DOJ-OIG Gatekeeper Report.
natural barriers to entry by unauthorized migrants and smugglers.8  As a result of this
geographical reality and in response to the large numbers of unauthorized aliens
crossing the border in the area, in 1990 the USBP began erecting a physical barrier
to deter illegal entries and drug smuggling.  The ensuing “primary” fence covered the
first 14 miles of the border, starting from the Pacific Ocean, and was constructed of
10-foot-high welded steel.9
Operation Gatekeeper
The primary fence, by itself, did not have a discernible impact on the influx of
unauthorized aliens coming across the border in San Diego.  As a result of this,
Operation Gatekeeper was officially announced in the San Diego sector on October
1, 1994.  The chief elements of the operation were large increases in the overall
manpower of the sector, and the deployment of USBP personnel directly along the
border to deter illegal entry.  The strategic plan called for three tiers of agent
deployment.  The first tier of agents was deployed to fixed positions on the border.
The agents in this first tier were charged with preventing illegal entry, apprehending
those who attempted to enter, and generally observing the border.  A second tier of
agents was deployed north of the border in the corridors that were heavily used by
illegal aliens.  The second tier of agents had more freedom of movement than the first
tier and were charged with containing and apprehending those aliens who made it
past the first tier.  The third tier of agents were typically assigned to man vehicle
checkpoints further inland to apprehend the traffic that eluded the first two tiers.   As
the Department of Justice Inspector General report notes, “given Gatekeeper’s
deterrence emphasis, many agents were assigned to first-tier, fixed positions along
the border. These agents were instructed to remain in their assigned positions rather
than chase alien traffic passing through adjacent areas. Prior to Gatekeeper, such
stationary positions were relatively rare.”10  
Operation Gatekeeper resulted in significant increases in the manpower and
other resources  deployed to San Diego sector.  Agents received additional night
vision goggles, portable radios, and four-wheel drive vehicles, and light towers and
seismic sensors were deployed.11  According to the former INS, between October
1994 and June of 1998, San Diego sector saw the following increases in resources:
! USBP agent manpower increased by 150%;
! Seismic sensors deployed increased by 171%;
! Vehicle fleet increased by 152%. 
! Infrared night-vision goggles increased from 12 to 49;
CRS-4
12 U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, “Operation
Gatekeeper Fact Sheet,” July 14, 1998.
13 DOJ-OIG Gatekeeper Report.
14 See California Coastal Commission, W 13a Staff Report and Recommendation on
Consistency Determination, CD-063-03, October 2003 [hereinafter “CCC Staff Report”],
at 14-16 (stating that construction of the primary fence significantly assisted the USBP’s
efforts in deterring smuggling attempts via drive-throughs using automobiles and
motorcycles).
15 GAO 95-30, p. 13.  
16 GAO 95-30, p. 13.  
! Permanent lighting increased from 1 mile to 6 miles, and 100
portable lighting platforms were deployed;
! Helicopter fleet increased from 6 to 10.12
As a result of the increase in resources and the new strategy that were the main
components of Operation Gatekeeper, the USBP estimated in 1998 that  the entire 66
miles of border patrolled by the San Diego sector’s agents could be brought under
control in five years.13
Sandia National Laboratory Study
According to CBP, the primary fence, in combination with various USBP
enforcement initiatives along the San Diego border region (i.e., Operation
Gatekeeper), proved to be successful but fiscally and environmentally costly.14  For
example, as unauthorized aliens and smugglers breached the primary fence and
attempted to evade detection, USBP agents were often forced to pursue the suspects
through environmentally sensitive areas.  It soon became apparent to immigration
officials and lawmakers that the USBP needed, among other things, a “rigid”
enforcement system that could integrate infrastructure (i.e., a multi-tiered fence and
roads), manpower, and new technologies to further control the border region.  
The concept of a three-tiered fence system was first recommended by a 1993
Sandia Laboratory study commissioned by the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS).  According to the Sandia study, the use of multiple
barriers in urban areas would increase the USBP’s ability to discourage a significant
number of illegal border crossers, to detect intruders early and delay them as long as
possible, and to channel a reduced number of illegal border crossers to geographic
locations where the USBP was better prepared to deal with them.15  The Sandia study
further noted that segments of the border could not be controlled at the immediate
border due to the ruggedness of the terrain, and recommended the use of highway
checkpoints in those areas to contain aliens after they had entered the country
illegally.16  The study concluded that aliens attempting to enter the United States from
Mexico had shown remarkable resiliency in bypassing or destroying obstacles in their
path, including the existing primary fence, and postulated that “[a] three-fence barrier
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Political Science Quarterly, vol. 113, no. 4, winter 1998-1999, p. 595.
18 8 U.S.C. §1103 (a)(5).
19 P.L. 104-208, §102.
20 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161) amended IIRIRA § 102 to
expressly refer to the Secretary of Homeland Security, rather than the Attorney General.
Although IIRIRA § 102 previously referred to the Attorney General, the authorities granted
by this section nonetheless appeared to rest with the Secretary of DHS following the
enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. See P.L. 104-208, §§102(a), 441, 1512(d)
and 1517 (references to the Attorney General or Commissioner in statute and regulations are
deemed to refer to the Secretary).
21 See CCC, Staff Report, supra note 14, at pp. 7 nt. 2 and 23 nt. 4.  
system with vehicle patrol roads between the fences and lights will provide the
necessary discouragement.”17
Congressional Border Barrier Legislation
As previously mentioned, the INS constructed the primary fencing in San Diego
using the broad authority granted to the AG in order to guard and control the U.S.
border by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).18  In 1996, Congress expressly
authorized the AG to construct barriers at the border for the first time in the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).19  This legislation
has subsequently been amended on several occasions.
Section 102 of IIRIRA — Improvement of Barriers 
at the Border
Section 102 of IIRIRA concerned the improvement and construction of barriers
at our international borders.  As originally enacted, § 102(a) appeared to give the
AG20 broad authority to install additional physical barriers and roads “in the vicinity
of the United States border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry into
the United States.”  The phrase “vicinity of the United States border” was not defined
in the INA or in immigration regulations.  The section also did not stipulate what
specific characteristics would designate an area as one of “high illegal entry.”
As originally enacted, § 102(b) mandated that the AG construct a barrier in the
border area near San Diego.  Specifically, §102(b) directed the AG to construct a
three-tiered barrier along the 14 miles of the international land border of the U.S.,
starting at the Pacific Ocean and extending eastward.  Section 102(b) ensured that the
AG will build a barrier, pursuant to his broader authority in §102(a), near the San
Diego area, although there is some debate concerning whether IIRIRA required
continuous triple fencing and roads for the entire 14-mile corridor.21  IIRIRA §
102(b) also provided authority for the acquisition of necessary easements, required
certain safety features be incorporated into the design of the fence, and authorized a
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greater than anticipated by IIRIRA and will be discussed in more detail later in this report.
23 For more detailed discussion of the Secure Fence Act, see infra at 29.
24 For more detailed discussion of the amendments made by the Consolidated Appropriations
Act, see infra at 26-27.
25 Department of Homeland Security, Environmental Impact Statement for the Completion
of the 14-mile Border Infrastructure System, San Diego, California (July 2003) [hereinafter
“EIS, San Diego Border Fence”].
26 P.L.107-273, §201(a).
total appropriation not to exceed $12 million to carry out the section.22 The Secure
Fence Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-367) amended IIRIRA § 102(b) by removing the
specific provisions authorizing construction of the San Diego fence (though not the
provisions concerning fence safety features, easements, or appropriations) and adding
provisions authorizing five stretches of two-layered reinforced fencing, totaling
roughly 850 miles, along the southwest border.23  IIRIRA § 102(b) was again
amended by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161).  The
Secretary of Homeland Security is now required to construct reinforced fencing along
not less than 700 miles of the southwest border, in locations where fencing is deemed
most practical and effective.24  The Consolidated Appropriations Act also amended
IIRIRA § 102(b) to authorize the appropriation of “sums as may be necessary to carry
out this subsection.”  Although IIRIRA § 102(b) no longer contains a specific
authorization for the San Diego fence, the project appears permissible under the
general fence authorization contained in IIRIRA §102(a).
As originally enacted, IIRIRA § 102(c) waived the Endangered Species Act
(ESA) of 1973 (16 U.S.C. §§1531 et seq.)  and the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) of 1969 (42 U.S.C. §§4321 et seq.),  to the extent the AG determined
necessary, in order to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers authorized to be
constructed under §102.  The waiver authority in this provision appeared to apply
both to barriers that may be constructed in the vicinity of the border and to the barrier
that was to be constructed near the San Diego area. The INS (and CBP after 2003)
never exercized this original waiver authority, instead choosing to comply with the
NEPA and the ESA.  The INS published a Final Environmental Impact Study
pursuant to NEPA and received a non-jeopardy Biological Opinion from the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service under the ESA.25  This waiver authority was expanded in
the 109th Congress by the REAL ID Act, which will be discussed in greater detail
subsequently, and DHS has exercised this expanded waiver authority in order to
continue construction of the San Diego border fence, as well as physical barriers and
roads along the southwest border.
Section 102(d) also provided the AG with various land acquisition authorities.
In 2002, Congress authorized the AG to use INS funds to purchase land for
enforcement fences and to construct the fences.26
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appropriations bill for FY2005.  During conference, language was revised in H.R. 1268, so
that the Secretary was authorized, but not required, to waive all “legal requirements”
(instead of “all laws”) deemed necessary to ensure construction of the security barriers.  The
conferees also added provisions to the REAL ID Act which made waiver decisions effective
upon publication in the Federal Register, and permitted federal court review of waiver
decisions only in limited circumstances.  The conference version of H.R. 1268 was enacted
on May 11, 2005.
29 Some courts, for instance, have found the “notwithstanding” phrase not dispositive in
determining the preemptive effect of a statute. See, e.g., E.P. Paup v. Director, OWCP, 999
F.2d 1341, 1348 (9th Cir. 1993); Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 792,
796 (9th Cir. 1996). But see Puerto Rico v. M/V Emily S., 132 F.3d  818 (1st Cir. 1997);
Schneider v. United States, 27 F.3d 1327 (8th Cir. 1994). 
Expansion of Waiver Authority under the REAL ID Act
As mentioned above, pursuant to the REAL ID Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-13,
Division B),27 the Secretary of DHS was given broad authority to waive legal
requirements that might otherwise delay the construction of the security barriers
described under § 102 of IIRIRA. Specifically, the Secretary of DHS is authorized
to waive all legal requirements necessary to ensure expeditious construction of these
security barriers.28  Such waivers are effective upon publication in the Federal
Register.   Federal district courts are provided with exclusive jurisdiction to review
claims alleging that the actions or decisions of the Secretary violate the U.S.
Constitution, and district court rulings may be reviewed only by the Supreme Court.
The scope of this waiver authority is substantial.  Whereas IIRIRA had
previously authorized the waiver of NEPA and ESA requirements, the REAL ID Act
authorizes the waiver of all legal requirements determined necessary by the Secretary
for the expeditious construction of authorized barriers, and only allows judicial
review for constitutional claims.  This waiver authority appears to apply to all
barriers that may be constructed under IIRIRA — that is, both to barriers constructed
in the vicinity of the border in areas of high illegal entry and to the barrier that is to
be constructed near the San Diego area.  Furthermore, these claims can only be
appealed to the Supreme Court (i.e., there is no intermediate appellate review), whose
review is discretionary. 
Some have expressed concern with the apparent breadth of the waiver provision
and the limited scope of judicial review of waiver decisions.  As passed into law, the
REAL ID Act waiver provision begins with the arguably ambiguous
“notwithstanding any other law” phrase29 and allows the waiver of all “legal
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30 “[T]he Constitution is filled with provisions that grant Congress or the States specific
power to legislate in certain areas,” Justice Black wrote for the Court, but “these granted
powers are always subject to the limitations that they may not be exercised in a way that
violates other specific provisions of the Constitution.” Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29
(1968).
31 Some of these waiver provisions grant the President or the head of an Executive agency
the authority to waive a law[s] if deemed necessary in the national interest or in the interest
of national defense.  See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §1107(a); 22 U.S.C. §2375(d); 29 U.S.C. §793; 42
U.S.C. §6212(b); 42 U.S.C. §6393(a)(2); 50 U.S.C. §2426(e). Examples of waiver authority
with a congressional notification element include 15 U.S.C. §719f; 22 U.S.C. §2378; 22
U.S.C. §2371; and 41 U.S.C. §413.  
32 P.L. 93-153, Title II, § 203 (1973); 43 U.S.C. §1652(c)-(d).
33 151 Cong. Rec. H557 (daily ed. February 10, 2005).
requirements.”  Although the term “legal requirement” is not defined, it cannot grant
the Secretary the authority to unilaterally waive a person’s constitutional rights.30  
The provision has been construed by Secretary Chertoff to apply to the waiver
of laws in their entirety, along with regulations and requirements deriving from or
relating to such laws.  Congress commonly waives preexisting laws, but the new
waiver provision uses language and a combination of terms not typically seen in law.
Most waiver provisions have contained qualifying language that (1) exempts an
action from other requirements contained in the Act that authorizes the action, (2)
specifically delineates the laws to be waived, or (3) waives a grouping of similar
laws.  Also common are waiver provisions that contain reporting requirements or
restrictions which appear to limit their breadth.31  One waiver authority that appears
analogous to that contained in the REAL ID Act is § 203 of the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Authorization Act, as amended, which authorizes the Secretary of the
Interior to waive all procedural requirements in law related to the construction of the
Trans-Alaska pipeline and limits judicial review to constitutional claims.32 
Although some argue that the waiver authority can extend to any law, including
those seemingly unrelated to building a fence (e.g., civil rights or child labor laws),
the provision is tempered by the requirement that the Secretary must determine the
law (subject to the waiver) is necessary “to ensure expeditious construction” of the
barriers.  In other words, the Secretary may be confined to laws that, in effect, will
impede the construction of the fence — not those that only tangentially relate to or
do not necessarily interfere with construction.  For example, because child labor laws
would not prevent the Secretary from expeditiously constructing the fence, it follows
that the Secretary does not have the authority to waive these protections.  This
interpretation is buttressed by the legislative history of the REAL ID Act, which
indicates that several Members called for the waiver provision because of laws that
were complicating and ultimately preventing the completion of the fence.33  The
decision to waive a law, nonetheless, is solely in the Secretary’s discretion.  Until
such time that DHS waives an applicable law, however, it must follow all legal
requirements normally imposed on federal agencies. 
On September 22, 2005, a notice was issued in the Federal Register indicating
that Secretary Chertoff, acting pursuant to the authority provided under the REAL ID
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34 Dept. of Homeland Security, “Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 as Amended by Section 102
of the REAL ID Act of 2005,” 70 Federal Register 55622-02, September 22, 2005
[hereinafter “DHS Notice”].
35 Dept. of Homeland Security, “Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 as Amended by Section 102
of the REAL ID Act of 2005 and as Amended by the Secure Fence Act of 2006,” 72 Federal
Register 2535-01, January 19, 2007.
36 Defenders of Wildlife v. Bureau of Land Management, Case 1:07-cv-01801-ESH (D.D.C.
2007).  Plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order can be viewed at
[http://www.defenders.org/resources/publications/programs_and_policy/in_the_courts/sa
n_pedro_border_wall_tro_filing.pdf].
37 Dept. of Homeland Security, “Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 as Amended by Section 102
of the REAL ID Act of 2005 and as Amended by the Secure Fence Act of 2006,” 72 Federal
Register 60870-01,October 26, 2007.
38 Plaintiffs’ amended complaint can be viewed at [http://www.defenders.org/resources/
publications/programs_and_policy/in_the_courts/san_pedro_border_wall_amended_
complaint.pdf].
Act, had exercised waiver authority over various legal requirements in order to
ensure the expeditious construction of the San Diego border fence.34 A listing of
laws waived by the Secretary can be found in Appendix F.  A notice was also
published on January 19, 2007, indicating that the Secretary was waiving various
legal requirements in order to ensure the expeditious construction of physical barriers
and roads in the vicinity of U.S. border area known as the Barry M. Goldwater Range
(BMGR), in southwestern Arizona.35 A listing of the federal laws waived by the
Secretary pursuant to this notice can be found in Appendix G.
On October 5, 2007, Defenders of Wildlife and the Sierra Club brought suit in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a temporary restraining
order enjoining DHS from border fence and road-building activities in the San Pedro
Riparian National Conservation Area, located in the vicinity of the U.S. border in
southeastern Arizona.36 On October 10, 2007, the presiding district court judge issued
a temporary restraining order (TRO) halting fence construction activities in the
Conservation Area, finding the relevant federal agencies had failed to carry out an
environmental assessment as legally required.  On October 26, 2007, a notice was
published in the Federal Register indicating that the Secretary of Homeland Security
had exercised waiver authority over various legal requirements in order to ensure the
expeditious construction of physical barriers or roads through the San Pedro Riparian
National Conservation Area (including any and all lands covered by the TRO),37
thereby enabling the DHS to resume fence construction.  A listing of the federal laws
waived by the Secretary pursuant to this notice can be found in Appendix H.
Defenders of Wildlife and the Sierra Club subsequently filed an amended complaint
on November 1, 2007,  challenging the constitutionality of DHS’s waiver authority.38
On December 18, 2007, the district court issued an opinion rejecting plaintiffs’
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40 From CBP Congressional Affairs, September 25, 2006.
41  P.L. 110-161, Div. E, § 564. Unlike under prior law, the Consolidated Appropriations
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constitutional challenge and granting DHS’s motion to dismiss the case.39
Consequently, the plaintiffs have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court, which is still pending.
On April 3, 2008, DHS published two separate notices in the Federal Register
indicating that the Secretary of Homeland Security had exercised his waiver authority
over a panoply of legal requirements regarding the construction of the border fence.
The first notice announced the exercise of the waiver authority to ensure the
construction of border fencing in Hidalgo County, Texas.  A list of the waived laws
can be found in Appendix I.  The other notice waived laws to expedite the
construction of fencing on certain lands along the border located in California,
Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.  Appendix J enumerates the laws waived by the
Secretary for this purpose.
The Secure Fence Act
The Secure Fence Act (P.L. 109-367) was signed into law on October 26, 2006.
The Act directed DHS to construct two-layered reinforced fencing and additional
physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors along five stretches of the
southwest border.  CBP has estimated that these stretches of fencing total roughly
850 miles40 of the southern border.  The five stretches of the border that DHS was
required to fence were the 20 miles around Tecate, CA; from Calexico, CA to
Douglas, AZ; from Columbus, NM to El Paso, TX; from Del Rio, TX to Eagle Pass,
TX; and from Laredo, TX to Brownsville, TX.  The Act designated the roughly 370
mile portion of the fence between Calexico, CA, and Douglas, AZ, a priority area and
directed DHS to ensure that “an interlocking surveillance camera system” is installed
along this area by May 30, 2007, and that the fence is completed in this area by May
30, 2008.  The Act also designated a 30-mile stretch around Laredo, TX, as a priority
area and directed DHS to complete this fencing by December 31, 2008. 
The requirements enacted by the Secure Fence Act were modified in the 110th
Congress by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2008 (P.L. 110-161), which
was enacted on December 26, 2007.  The Act makes a number of modifications to
§102 of IIRIRA, significantly increasing the Secretary of Homeland Security’s
discretion as to where to construct fencing along the southwest border.  Whereas the
Secretary was previously required to install roughly 850 miles of reinforced fencing
along five stretches of the southwest border, a more general requirement has now
been imposed on the Secretary to construct reinforced fencing:
along not less than 700 miles of the southwest border where fencing would be
most practical and effective and provide for the installation of additional physical




Act, as enacted, does not specify that reinforced fencing be “at least 2 layers.”  See P.L.
104-208, Div. C, § 102(b), as amended by P.L. 109-367, § 3.
42 Ibid.
The Act further specifies that the Secretary of Homeland Security is not required to
install:
fencing, physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors in a particular
location along an international border of the United States, if the Secretary
determines that the use or placement of such resources is not the most
appropriate means to achieve and maintain operational control over the
international border at such location.42
The Act also amends the provisions of IIRIRA §102 concerning fence
construction in priority areas, by requiring the Secretary of Homeland Security to
identify either 370 miles or “other mileage” along the southwest border where
fencing would be most practical and effective, and to complete construction of
fencing  in identified areas by December 31, 2008.  This language replaces the prior
language of IIRIRA §102 concerning priority areas, which had been added by the
Secure Fence Act.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act does not modify the existing waiver
provision or limitation on judicial review contained in IIRIRA §102, but does impose
new consultation requirements on the Secretary of Homeland Security when carrying
out duties under this section, and conditions appropriations under the Act upon
compliance with these requirements.  Specifically, the Secretary is required to consult
with the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture, state and local governments,
Indian tribes, and property owners “to minimize the impact on the environment,
culture, commerce, and quality of life” in areas near where fencing is to be
constructed.  The Act specifies that this consultation requirement does not create or
negate any right to legal action by an affected person or entity.
The San Diego Sandia Fence
In 1996, construction began on the secondary fence that had been recommended
by the Sandia study with congressional approval.  The new fence was to parallel the
fourteen miles of primary fence already constructed on land patrolled by the Imperial
Beach Station of the San Diego sector, and included permanent lighting as well as an
access road in between the two layers of fencing.  Of the 14 miles of fencing
authorized to be constructed by IIRIRA, nine miles of the triple fence had been
completed by the end of FY2005.  Two sections, including the final three mile stretch
of fence that leads to the Pacific Ocean, have not been finished.  
The California Coastal Commission
In order to finish the fence, the USBP proposed to fill a deep canyon known as
“Smuggler’s Gulch” with over two million cubic yards of dirt.  The triple-fence
CRS-12
43 See CCC, Staff Report, at 5-7.  After California’s Coastal Management Plan was approved
by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration pursuant to the CZMA in 1977,
apparently all federal activities affecting coastal zone resources in California became subject
to the CCC’s regulatory purview.  
44 16 U.S.C. §1456(c).
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would then be extended across the filled gulch.  California’s Coastal Commission
(CCC), however, objected to and essentially halted the completion of the fence in
February 2004, because it determined that CBP had not demonstrated, among other
things, that the project was consistent “to the maximum extent practicable” with the
policies of the California Coastal Management Program — a state program approved
under the federal Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) (16 U.S.C. §§1451-
1464).43  The CZMA requires federal agency activity within or outside the coastal
zone that affects any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone to be
carried out in a manner that is consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the
policies of an approved state management program.44  If a federal court finds a
federal activity to be inconsistent with an approved state program and the Secretary
of DHS (Secretary) determines that compliance is unlikely to be achieved through
mediation, the President may exempt from compliance the activity if the President
determines that the activity is in the “paramount interest of the United States.”45   
According to the CCC, CBP did not believe that it could make further
environmental concessions and still comply with IIRIRA.  The CCC held that
Congress did not specify a particular design in the IIRIRA, and that CBP failed to
present a convincing argument that the less environmentally damaging alternative
projects it rejected would have prevented compliance with the IIRIRA.  Specifically,
the CCC was concerned with the potential for significant adverse effects on (1) the
Tijuana River National Estuarine Research and Reserve; (2) state and federally listed
threatened and endangered species; (3) lands set aside for protection within
California’s Multiple Species Conservation Program; and, (4) other aspects of the
environment.  In response to the CCC’s findings, Congress expanded the waiver
authority in the REAL ID Act, described in more detail below, in order to allow DHS
to waive the CZMA, among other things.
  
Current Status of the San Diego Triple Fence
As previously discussed, DHS announced in September 2005 that it was
applying its waiver authority established by the REAL ID Act to facilitate the
completion of the San Diego fence.46  The military has now begun the process of
upgrading and rebuilding the San Diego border fence.  Congress appropriated $31
million in FY2007 for construction of the remaining 4.5 miles of the San Diego
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48 Interview with CBP Congressional Affairs, January 26 , 2006.
49 If the same person is apprehended multiple times attempting to enter the country in one
year, each apprehension will be counted separately by the USBP in generating their
apprehension statistics.  This means that apprehension statistics may overstate the number
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fence.47  DHS has begun construction on the final 4.5 miles of the San Diego fence,
beginning the process of filling in the area known as Smuggler’s Gulch.48
The San Diego Fence and USBP Apprehensions
Apprehension statistics have long been used as a performance measure by the
USBP.  However, the number of apprehensions may be a misleading statistic for
several reasons, including the data’s focus on events rather than people49 and the fact
that there are no reliable estimates for how many aliens successfully evade capture.
This makes it difficult to establish a firm correlation between the number of
apprehensions in a given sector and the number of people attempting to enter through
that sector.  While caution should be taken when attempting to draw conclusions
about the efficacy of policy initiatives based solely on apprehensions statistics, they
remain the most reliable way to codify trends in illegal migration along the border.
The San Diego fence spans two border patrol stations within the San Diego
sector:  Imperial Beach station and Chula Vista station.  As previously noted, the
primary fence was constructed in those two stations beginning in FY1990; the
secondary fence was constructed beginning in FY1996.  Figure 1 shows the stark
decrease in apprehensions at the Imperial Beach station from FY1992 to FY2004.
The majority of the decrease occurred in the four year period from FY1995 through
FY1998 and coincided with Operation Gatekeeper, which as previously noted
combined the construction of fencing along the border with an increase in agents and
other resources deployed directly along the border.  For the period from FY1998 to
FY2004, apprehensions at the Imperial Beach station averaged about 14,000 each
year.
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Figure 2 shows the apprehensions at the Chula Vista station over the same
period of time.  The trend in apprehensions at Chula Vista is somewhat similar to
Imperial Beach, with overall apprehensions dropping significantly from FY1992 to
FY2002.  Apprehensions increased slightly from FY2002 to FY2004, but remain far
below their early 1990s levels.  Interestingly, the rate of decline in Chula Vista in the
mid-1990s lagged behind the rate of decline in Imperial Beach station during this
period.  This suggests that as enforcement ramped up in Imperial Beach station,
unauthorized migration shifted westward to Chula Vista.  From FY1992 to FY1998,
for example, apprehensions decreased by 92% in Imperial Beach, but only by 54%
in Chula Vista. From FY1998 through FY2001, apprehensions leveled off in Imperial
Beach, averaging around 16,000 a year, but continued to decline at Chula Vista, from
72,648 in FY1998 to 3,080 in FY2002.  Overall, the trend indicates the following:
as enforcement measures, in this case including fencing, were deployed — first
focusing on Imperial Beach, and later extending to Chula Vista — the flow of
unauthorized migration pushed eastward.  The drop in apprehensions occurred first



























Figure 1.  Imperial Beach Station Apprehensions
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50 For more information on overall apprehension trends, please refer to CRS Report
RL32562, Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol, by Blas Nuñez-Neto.
Source: CRS analysis of CBP data.
Figure 3 shows the aggregate apprehensions made at the other San Diego sector
stations, excluding Imperial Beach and Chula Vista.  Those stations are El Cajon,
Campo, San Clemente, Temecula, and Brown Field.  Figure 3 shows that at the time
apprehensions were beginning to decline in Imperial Beach (starting in FY1995) and
Chula Vista (starting in FY1996), apprehensions at other San Diego sector stations
almost doubled.  This suggests that as enforcement efforts increased in the two
westernmost stations, including the installation of fencing and the deployment of
additional agents, the flow of illegal migration pushed eastward to the other stations
in the San Diego sector.  While apprehensions declined in the non-fenced stations of
the San Diego sector from FY1997 to FY2001, the rate of decline was not as steep
as the rate of decline at the stations where fencing was deployed.  Overall, the decline
in apprehensions in the rest of the San Diego sector has lagged behind the decreases
in Imperial Beach and Chula Vista: from FY1992 to FY2004, apprehensions in the
other San Diego sector stations decreased by 42%, compared to decreases of 95% in
Imperial Beach and 94% in Chula Vista.  In FY2003 and FY2004, apprehensions
increased slightly in the rest of San Diego sector, possibly in response to the



































Figure 2.  Chula Vista Station Apprehensions
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installation of border fencing, in combination with an increase in agent manpower
and technological assets, has had a significant effect on the apprehensions made in
the San Diego sector.  This in turn suggests that fewer unauthorized aliens are
attempting to cross the border in the San Diego sector as a result of the increased
enforcement measures, including fencing, manpower, and other resources, that were
deployed to that sector.
Source: CRS analysis of CBP data.
Figure 4 shows overall San Diego sector apprehensions, breaking out the
Imperial Beach and Chula Vista stations, and compares them to the apprehensions
made at the Tucson sector between FY1992 and FY2004.  The data used to create
this graph can be seen presented in table form in Appendix E.  Figure 4 shows that
in FY1992, Imperial Beach and Chula Vista accounted for 64% of all apprehensions
made in the San Diego sector; by FY2004 the two stations accounted for only 14%
of all apprehensions made in the sector. However, as apprehensions declined in
Imperial Beach and Chula Vista stations and San Diego sector as a whole over the
late 1990s and early 2000s, apprehensions in the Tucson sector in Arizona increased
significantly over this period.  Over the 12-year period between 1992 and 2004,
overall apprehensions in the San Diego sector declined by 76%.  However, as
apprehensions were decreasing in the San Diego sector, they were increasing in other
sectors further east.  This increase was most notable within the Tucson sector in
Arizona, where apprehensions increased six-fold (591%) between FY1992 and
FY2004.  As Figure 4 shows, overall apprehensions in the San Diego and Tucson

































Figure 3.  Apprehensions at San Diego Sector Stations, 
Excluding Imperial Beach and Chula Vista
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Diego sector accounting for the lion’s share during the early 1990s and the Tucson
sector accounting for the majority in the early 2000s.  This provides further indication
that the construction of the fence, combined with the increases in manpower in the
San Diego sector, changed the patterns of migration for unauthorized aliens
attempting to enter the country illegally from Mexico. 
Source: CRS analysis of CBP data.
As Figures 1-4 show, the increased deployment of agents, infrastructure,
technology, and other resources within the San Diego sector has resulted in a
significant decline in the number of apprehensions made in that sector.  Nationally,
apprehensions made by the USBP grew steadily through the late 1990s, only to
decline in the early 2000s.  However, in 1992 the USBP apprehended 1.2 million
unauthorized aliens; in 2004, the USBP also apprehended 1.2 million unauthorized
aliens.51 While the increased enforcement in the San Diego sector has resulted in a
shift in migration patterns for unauthorized aliens, it does not appear to have
decreased the overall number of apprehensions made each year by USBP agents.  As
previously noted, apprehensions statistics can be somewhat misleading, but they


























Other San Diego Sector Stations
Figure 4.  Apprehensions at San Diego Sector Stations 
and Tucson Sector
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53 Defenders of Wildlife, On the Line — The Impacts of Immigration Policy on Wildlife and
Habitat in the Arizona Borderlands, 2006, p. 26.  (Hereinafter, Defenders of Wildlife, On
the Line.)
border.  However, it is impossible to ascertain solely by looking at apprehensions
statistics how many unauthorized aliens are attempting to enter the country illegally,
because it is unclear how many individuals evade being captured by the USBP each
year.
Border Barrier Construction
The USBP has been constructing and maintaining barriers along the
international land border since 1991.  These barriers have historically been limited
to selected urban areas as part of the USBP’s overall strategy of rerouting illegal
migration away from urban areas towards geographically isolated areas where their
agents have a tactical advantage over border crossers.  Two main types of border
fencing have been constructed: primary fencing located directly on the border along
several urban areas; and Sandia fencing, also known as secondary or triple fencing,
in San Diego. Additionally, the USBP has begun installing permanent vehicle
barriers in various segments of the border.  Vehicle barriers are designed to impede
the entry of vehicles while allowing individuals and animals to cross the border
freely.  As such, they have a lower environmental footprint than border fencing.
Steps Prior to Construction
Several considerations come into play whenever the USBP contemplates
construction along the border.  There are a number of steps that must be taken before
the construction process can begin.  These steps include, but are not limited to,
determining what the environmental impact of the construction will be;  acquiring the
land needed for the fence; acquiring the materials that will be used for the fence; and
securing the assistance of the Corps of Engineers and the National Guard for the
construction process.  The role the Corps of Engineers plays in assisting the USBP
with th entire process of constructing border fencing, including acquiring materials,
will be discussed subsequently in the construction process section.  This section will
cover the issues associated with environmental assessments and land acquisition.
Environmental Impact Assessments.  Land along the southwest border
supports a number of animals and plants and provides habitat to many protected
species.  The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, for example, reported that a total of 18
federally protected species have the potential to be found along certain sections of the
California border.52  In Arizona, at least 39 federally endangered, threatened, or
candidate species can be found living along its border.53  More than 85% of the lands
directly along the Arizona border are federal lands, much of it set aside to protect
wilderness and wildlife.  For example, the Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument,
the Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge, and the Buenos Aires National Wildlife
Refuge can all be found adjacent to the border.  The southwest border region is
CRS-19
54 Eilene Zimmerman, SFGate.com, Border protections imperil environment — Last
wilderness area south of San Diego could be damaged, February 27, 2006, at
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55 EIS, San Diego Border Fence, at 1-10. 
56 Id. at 1-11.
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58 Letter from Peter C. Sornsen, Acting Field Supervisor, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, to James
Caffrey, Acting Director, Facilities & Engineering Division, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Re: Endangered Species Consultation for the Proposed 14-Mile Border
Infrastructure System (July 1, 2003) (on file with author).
59 8 U.S.C. §1103(b).
60 8 U.S.C. §1101 note (b)(2). 
considered a fragile environment, susceptible to harm from even the slightest changes
to the ecosystem.54  
Many are concerned with the geographic footprint and subsequent
environmental impacts of both illegal immigration and USBP activities.  Until the
early 1990s, the USBP’s enforcement activities along the border were nominal and
the environmental consequences of illegal crossings went largely unnoticed.  As
illicit trafficking escalated, however, so did the USBP’s activities and enforcement
footprint, including the construction of fencing and other barriers.  Although the San
Diego fence reportedly reduced the number of aliens attempting to drive across the
open border (and consequently the enforcement footprint to stop such activities), it
did little to block the flow of foot traffic.55  Illegal aliens often damage habitat by
cutting vegetation for shelter and fire, causing wildfires, increasing erosion through
repeated use of trails, and discarding trash.56  Environmentalists claim that the
USBP’s enforcement activities, including the pursuit of illegal aliens, use of off-road
vehicles and construction of roads and fences, compound the degradation.57  The
REAL ID Act will allow the DHS Secretary to waive any legal requirements needed
to expedite the construction of border fencing.  Until such time that DHS waives an
applicable law, however, it must follow all legal requirements normally imposed on
federal agencies, including, for example, NEPA documentary requirements.
Land Acquisition.  The construction of a fence along the border necessarily
requires the government to acquire some type of interest in the land.  The San Diego
border fence, for example, is to extend approximately 150-feet north of the
international boundary.58  Current immigration law authorizes the Secretary of DHS
to contract for and buy any interest in land adjacent to or in the vicinity of the
international land border when the Secretary deems the land essential to control and
guard the border against any violation of immigration law.59  It also authorizes the
Secretary to accept any interest in land along the border as a gift and to commence
condemnation proceedings if a reasonable purchase price can not be agreed upon.
With respect to the San Diego border fence, the law requires the Secretary to
promptly acquire such easements as necessary to implement the statute.60  If DHS
exercises its eminent domain powers, it must provide just compensation as required
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by the Constitution.  In the case of the San Diego fence, construction of the final 4.5
miles continues to be held up as DHS acquires the necessary land.  
DHS is authorized to acquire new interests in lands under the INA.  However,
the federal government may already own some land along the border pursuant to
presidential proclamations made long ago.  In 1907, President Roosevelt reserved
from entry and set apart as a public reservation all public lands within 60-feet of the
international boundary between the United States and Mexico within the State of
California and the Territories of Arizona and New Mexico.61  Known as the
“Roosevelt Reservation,” this land withdrawal was found “necessary for the public
welfare ... as a protection against the smuggling of goods.”  The proclamation
excepted from the reservation all lands, which, as of its date, were (1) embraced in
any legal entry; (2) covered by any lawful filing, selection or rights of way duly
recorded in the proper U.S. Land Office; (3) validly settled pursuant to law; or (4)
within any withdrawal or reservation for any use or purpose inconsistent with its
purposes.  A similar reservation was made by President Taft in 1912, for all public
lands laying within 60-feet of the boundary line between the United States and
Canada.62  This proclamation states that the customs and immigration laws of the
United States could be better enforced and the public welfare thereby advanced by
the retention in the federal government of complete control of the use and occupation
of lands abutting the international boundary lines.  The proclamation also provides
exceptions similar to those described in the Roosevelt Reservation.
Border Fence Construction Process and Funding
CBP has, in the past, constructed the majority of border fencing under a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the ECSO (Engineering and Construction
Support Office) of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps).  ECSO manages
several components of the construction process for CBP, including planning and
acquisition of real estate; drafting the environmental protection plan; designing the
project and formulating the engineering costs; overseeing the construction process;
and enforcing the appropriate warranties.  On most of the tactical infrastructure
projects, National Guard units and military units from the Department of Defense
(DOD) Joint Task Force North provide the labor.  DOD uses these projects as part
of their training regimen, leveraging their ability to deploy tactical infrastructure and
thereby providing zero labor costs to CBP.63  The funding for land acquisition and
CRS-21
63 (...continued)
2007, pg.  CBP Construction 20.  Hereafter referred to as DHS FY2007 Justifications.
64 FY2006 is an exception.  Within the conference report, $35 million was identified for the
Southwest Border Fence and $35 million was identified for the construction of vehicle
barriers and other border infrastructure in Tucson sector.  H.Rept. 109-241.
fence materials comes out of the CBP construction account within the DHS
appropriation.  Specific funding for fence construction is rarely identified in the
conference reports, though it typically has been identified within the DHS (and
previously the former INS) Congressional Budget Justifications.64  Table 1 shows the
overall amount appropriated for the USBP construction account, and the specific
amounts identified for tactical infrastructure within that account, since FY1996.
Appropriations for fencing and other border barriers has increased markedly over the
past five years, from $6 million in FY2002 to $647 million in FY2007.  The FY2008
appropriation, according to CBP, would include $196 million for fence construction.




















Sources: For FY2006, the amounts appropriated for construction and tactical infrastructure were
identified from the FY2007 DHS Congressional Budget Justifications.  For FY2004-FY2005, the
amounts appropriated for construction and tactical infrastructure were identified from the FY2006
DHS Congressional Budget Justifications.  FY2003 construction and tactical infrastructure funding
was identified from the FY2005 DHS Congressional Budget Justifications.  FY1996-FY2002 tactical
infrastructure funding was identified in the FY2003 INS Congressional Budget Justifications; funding
for FY1998-FY2000 includes San Diego fencing as well as fencing, light, and road projects in El
Centro, Tucson, El Paso, and Marfa.  FY2001 and FY2002 construction funding identified from the
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67 SBInet is the technological and infrastructure component of the Secure Border Initiative
(SBI), a multifaceted approach to securing the border.  In its FY2007 budget submission,
DHS asserted that it had “developed a three-pillar approach under the SBI that will focus
on controlling the border, building a robust interior enforcement program, and establishing
a Temporary Worker Program.”  DHS FY2007 Justification, p. CBP S&E 4.
68 The FY2008 total enacted appropriation of for SBInet was $1,225 million; this total
included an emergency appropriation of $1,053 million.  However this may be somewhat
misleading because the FY2008 request for the account, which had been fully funded by
both the House and Senate Committees on Appropriation, was $1,000 million.  The amount
of additional funding (above the request) provided in FY2008 was thus $225 million and not
$1,053 million.
69 DHS FY2009 Justification, p. CBP BSFIT 11.
FY2002 INS Congressional Budget Justifications.  FY2000 construction funding identified from the
FY2001 INS Congressional Budget Justifications and H.Rept. 107-278.  FY1999 construction funding
identified from P.L. 105-277.  FY1998 construction funding identified from P.L. 105-119. FY1997
funding identified from P.L. 104-208.  FY1996 construction funding identified from P.L. 104-134.
Notes:  In FY2003 immigration inspections from the former INS, Customs inspections from the
former customs service, and the USBP were merged to form the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection within DHS.  As a result of this the data for years prior to FY2003 may not be comparable
with the data for FY2004 and after.  The USBP construction account has been used to fund a number
of projects at the border, including fencing, vehicle barriers, roads, and USBP stations and
checkpoints.   In FY2007, the appropriations committee created a new Border Security Fencing,
Infrastructure, and Technology (BSFIT) account within the CBP.  This account funds the construction
of fencing, other infrastructure such as roads and vehicle barriers, and border technologies such as
cameras and sensors.  Border fencing and infrastructure construction was transferred from the USBP
Construction account to the new BSFIT account.   
a.   In FY2008, Congress appropriated $1,225 million for BSFIT in the Consolidated Appropriations
Act (P.L.110-161).  According to CBP, $196 million will be used for border fencing.65 
b. The BSFIT appropriation in the FY2007 DHS Appropriation Act was $1.2 billion (see H.Rept. 109-
699).  Combined with the $300 million already appropriated in the emergency supplemental,
the overall BSFIT appropriation for FY2007 was $1.5 billion.  The appropriators  did not offer
guidance on how this funding was to be allocated between these different purposes.  According
to CBP, $647 million will be obligated for fencing in FY2007.66 
In FY2009, the Administration requested $775 million for the deployment of
SBInet-related67 technologies and infrastructures in FY2009, a decrease of $450
million over the FY2008-enacted level of $1,225 million.68  Within the FY2009
request, the Administration is proposing to allocate $275 million for developing and
deploying additional technology and infrastructure solutions to the southwest border.
An additional $410 million is requested for operations and maintenance of the
cameras, sensors, and fencing that will have been constructed by the end of calendar
year 2008 with prior-year funding.69  It does not appear that this request would
include funding for new fencing or vehicle barriers at the border.  Instead, the
Administration notes that this funding will cover the costs associated with operating
and maintaining the technologies that have been deployed to the border as part of the
SBInet program, as well as the 370 miles of fencing and 300 miles of vehicle
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71 From interviews with CBP, November 30, 2005 and September 13, 2006, and the Corps
of Engineers, November 29, 2005. 
barriers, which are scheduled to be completed by the end of calendar year 2008 with
funding appropriated in FY2007 and FY2008. Most of the fencing that will be
constructed in 2008 will be contracted out; the Corps and the National Guard will be
involved mainly in the project to finish the San Diego fence.70
Under the MOA, once CBP purchases the materials and acquires the land, the
Corps of Engineers undertakes the engineering studies and provides the manpower
and machinery that are used to install the fencing.  The actual manpower is typically
provided by the State National Guard (the California National Guard, for example,
constructed much of the San Diego fence), although occasionally the military, and
sometimes the USBP, are involved in the construction.71  The Corps of Engineers
funding comes from the Department of Defense Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug
Activities Account.  Table 2 shows the funding for the “Southwest Border Fence”
sub-account within this DOD Account, from FY1997 to FY2006.  As previously
noted, however, much of the new fence construction currently taking place is being
done by private contractors.
Table 2.  DOD Funding for the Southwest Border Fence
(millions of dollars)













Source: FY2008, H.Rept. 110-434; FY2007, H.Rept. 109-676; FY2006, H.Rept. 109-359; FY2005,
H.Rept. 108-622; FY2004, H.Rept. 108-283; FY2004, H.Rept. 107-732; FY2002, H.Rept. 107-333;
FY2002, H.Rept. 106-945; FY2000, H.Rept. 106-371, FY1999, H.Rept. 105-746; FY1998, H.Rept.
105-265; FY1997, H.Rept. 104-724.  
Notes: N/A means not available.  No funding was identified for border fencing in the FY2007 DOD
Conference report, H.Rept. 109-676.  The House Committee had recommended $8 million for this
activity in H.Rept. 109-504, while the Senate Committee had not recommended any funding for it in
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72 Bollard fencing is comprised of vertical installations of solid concrete, metal spheres, or
large posts, embedded into the ground at small enough intervals as to be impassable. Bollard
fencing is difficult to compromise but expensive to install.  See Appendix A for a depiction
of bollard fencing.
73 Picket fencing is comprised of metal stakes set sufficiently close together as to be
impassable.  See Appendix A for a depiction of picket fencing.
74 Roughly 13 miles of these alternate forms of fencing have been constructed to date,
according to an interview with CBP Congressional Affairs on September 13, 2006.
75 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Construction Engineering Research Laboratories,
Engineering Life-Cycle Cost Comparison Study of Barrier Fencing Systems, USACERL
Technical Report 99/28, February 1999, p. 14.  Hereafter referred to as Corps of Engineers
Study.  
76 Interview with CBP Congressional Affairs, September 13, 2006.
77 Telephone conversation with CBP, November 30, 2005.
78 The Corps of Engineers used 1997 dollars in their study.  For the purposes of this report,
the numbers predicted by the Corps were adjusted to 2005 dollars using the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) deflator, available at [http://www1.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/inflateGDP.html].  This
website appears to be no longer operating; however, GDP deflator tables are also published
by the Bureau of Economic Adjustment (BEA) at the Department of Commerce and are
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S.Rept. 109-292. FY2005 funding for the “Southwest Border Fence” sub-account was also not
identified in the DOD Conference Report, H.Rept. 108-622.  The House Committee had recommended
$7 million for this sub-account in H.Rept. 108-553; while the Senate Committee had not recommended
any funding for it in S.Rept. 108-284. 
Types of Fences and Barriers
The USBP currently uses three main types of barriers along the border: primary
fencing immediately on the international border, Sandia fencing behind the primary
fencing, and vehicle barriers meant to stop vehicles, but not people on foot, from
traversing the border.  While other forms of primary fencing, such as bollard
fencing72 and picket fencing,73 have been constructed in limited areas,74 historically
the agency has largely focused on using the landing mat fencing as a primary fence
and the Sandia fence as a secondary fence.  
Landing Mat Fencing.   Landing mat fencing is composed of army surplus
carbon steel landing mats which were used to create landing strips during the
Vietnam War.  The landing mats form panels 12 feet long, 20 inches wide, and 1/4
inch thick, which are welded to steel pipes buried 8 feet deep every 6 feet along the
fence.  Each mile of fencing requires the use of 3,080 panels.75  There are about 5
miles of surplus landing mat fencing remaining as of 2006.76  According to the
USBP, sites that feature landing mat fencing include the following USBP stations:
Campo, CA; Yuma, AZ; Nogales, AZ; Naco, AZ; Douglas, AZ, and El Paso, TX.77
In a 1999 study which was commissioned by the INS and performed under a
Memorandum of Understanding, the Corps of Engineers predicted that construction




=1997&LastYear=2005&Freq=yr].   The actual predictions made by the Corps for
constructing and maintaining primary fencing, in 1997 dollars, were $341,584 to $379,538
per mile for construction costs, and $1,534 to $15,629 per mile per year in maintenance
costs.  The 25-year life-cycle costs for constructing and maintaining landing mat fencing
were predicted to range between $4,725,572 and $7,340,098 per mile in 1997 dollars.
79 Corps of Engineers Study, p. 21.
80 Net present value is a term used by the Corps of Engineers in their life cycle costs
analyses for construction projects.  It amortizes the future costs of a project and shows what
the entire costs of the project will be.  In this case, these numbers represent 25 year
predictions and have been adjusted from 1997 dollars to 2005 dollars using a GDP Deflator
81 DHS published a Federal Register notice on September 22, 2005, declaring the waiver of,
in their entirety, (1) the National Environmental Protection Act  (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.);
(2) the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.); (3) the Coastal Zone Management
Act (16 U.S.C. 1451 et seq.); (4) the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. §§1251
et seq.); (5) the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. §§470 et seq.); (6) the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (16 U.S.C. §§703 et seq.); (7) the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C.
§§7401 et seq.); and (8) the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§551 et seq.).
82 DHS FY2007 Justifications, p. CBP Construction 18.
This estimate includes the cost of materials, despite the fact that the landing mat
fencing constructed to date has been comprised of army-surplus panels acquired by
CBP at no cost.  As previously noted, however, only about 5 miles of surplus landing
mat fencing material remains available.  Maintenance costs per year could vary
widely depending on the number of breaches the fence undergoes.  Low levels of
damage to the fence would result in low annual repair costs, while a large number of
breaches could result in stretches of fencing needing to be replaced.  Per mile, the
Corps of Engineers estimated that yearly maintenance costs would probably range
from $1,742 to $17,753.79  The Corps of Engineers noted that the net present value80
of the fence after 25 years of operation would range from $5.4 million and $8.3
million per mile depending on the amount of damage sustained by the fencing each
year.  
Sandia Secondary Fence.  The secondary fence proposed by the Sandia
study has only been constructed over roughly 9.5 miles of the 14 miles in the original
plan due to environmental concerns voiced by the California Coastal Commission.
As previously discussed, P.L. 109-13 included language that will allow waiver of all
legal requirements determined necessary by the Secretary of DHS for the expeditious
construction of authorized barriers and only allows judicial review for constitutional
claims.  On September 14, 2005, DHS announced it is applying its new waiver
authority to complete the San Diego fence.81  DHS is currently estimating that it will
cost an additional $66 million to finish the San Diego fence, bringing overall costs
for this 14 mile-long project to $127 million.  Additionally, DHS notes that it will use
a mix of DOD resources and private contractors to finish the fence, and that the cost
of using contractors is included in the request.82
The Sandia fence, as it has been constructed in the San Diego sector, is a
secondary fence constructed behind the primary fence.  Enough space is left between
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83 The numbers used by the Corps of Engineers were cited in 1997 dollars.  They have been
adjusted to 2005 dollars using the GDP deflator cited above.  The actual costs per mile in
the Corps of Engineers Study were:  $691,680 to $768,533 for construction, and $839 to
$6,715 for maintenance.  Net Present Value after 25 years in 1997 dollars ranged from $9.73
million to $54.23 million.  Corps of Engineer Study, pp. 3 and 23.
84 Jonathan Athens, “Officials say OK to Border Fence,” YumaSun.com (July 20, 2005)
available at [http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive14980.html].
85 DHS FY2007 Justifications, pg. CBP Construction-7.  CBP project length does not
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the two fences to accommodate an access road.  The secondary fence is an angled
two-piece fence.  The fence is vertical up to ten feet high, and then extends out at an
angle towards the climber.  This  prevents climbing by using gravity and the weight
of the climber against them.  The Corps of Engineers estimated that Sandia fencing
costs per mile would range from $785,679 to $872,977 for construction and $953 to
$7,628 per mile yearly for maintenance.  Additionally, the Corps of Engineers study
notes that the Sandia fence would possibly need to be replaced in the fifth year of
operation and in every fourth year thereafter if man-made damage to the fence was
“severe and ongoing.”  For this reason, in the study the Corps of Engineers noted that
the net present value of the fence after 25 years of operation, per mile, would range
from $11.1 million to $61.6 million.83
Other Border Barriers: Vehicle Barriers
The USBP utilizes various different types of barriers to impede vehicles from
crossing into the United States from Mexico.  Some of these barriers are temporary
and can be moved to different locations when needed, others are permanent barriers.
The main purpose of vehicle barriers is to prevent smugglers from easily driving their
vehicles across the border.
 
Permanent Vehicle Barriers.  Permanent vehicle barriers, as their name
suggests, are not designed to be moved but rather are permanent installations.
Permanent vehicle barriers are typically steel posts, or bollards, that are excavated 5
feet deep and inserted into a poured concrete base.  The posts alternate in above-
ground height in order to dissuade individuals from forming a ramp over the barrier.
They are spaced so as to allow foot and animal traffic but not vehicular traffic.  The
USBP recently began building permanent vehicle barriers in the Yuma sector, with
a substantial stretch slated to be built along the Organ Pipe Cactus National
Monument.    When linked with the 30 miles of vehicle barriers built by the National
Park Service, a USBP spokesman reportedly noted that the total 123 mile length of
the project “will form the largest continuous physical barrier along the border in the
nation.”84 
In the FY2007 DHS Congressional Budget Justifications, DHS notes that the
Yuma vehicle barrier project would take until at least 2010 (and possibly longer) to
complete if CBP continued to use the Corps of Engineers and other military
personnel to construct the barriers.  Instead, CBP proposes hiring commercial
contractors to build 39 miles of vehicle barriers in the Yuma sector, or almost half
of the project’s 93 mile total.85  CBP is projecting that the project will be completed
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include the 30 miles of vehicle barriers maintained by the National Park Service.
86 DHS FY2007 Justifications, pg. CBP Construction-18.  It is unclear why the project is
predicted to take less time with contractors, and yet the overall completion date for the
construction is predicted to be 2011.
87 From the National Park Service, February 9, 2006.  The National Park Service notes that
30 miles of permanent vehicle barriers are being built at the Organ Pipe Cactus National
Monument, and one mile is being built in the Coronado National Monument.
88 U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Final Environmental
Assessment U.S. Border Patrol Temporary Vehicle Barriers Naco and Douglas, Arizona,
November 2002.
89  SBInet forms part of the Secure Border Initiative, which DHS has billed as a multifaceted
approach to securing the border.  DHS FY2007 Justifications, pg. CBP S&E-4.
90 Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, “Fence Lab To Test
Effective Low Cost Solutions,” Secure Border Initiative Monthly, April 2007.
by FY2011, and that the overall project costs will be $116 million.86  This means that,
overall, the project will cost roughly $1.25 million per mile.  The National Park
Service has spent $11.1 million to construct 18 miles of permanent vehicle barriers
in Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument, and has obligated, but not yet spent, an
additional $6.6 million in FY2005 funding to complete the remaining 13 miles of the
project.87
Temporary Vehicle Barriers. Temporary vehicle barriers are typically built
from welded metal, such as railroad track, but can also be constructed from telephone
poles or pipe.  These barriers are built so that they cannot be rolled or moved
manually; they can only be moved with a forklift or a front-end loader.  They are
usually built at USBP stations and transported to areas of high vehicle entry, where
they are placed and chained together.88  The main advantage of the temporary vehicle
barriers is their ability to be redeployed to different areas to address changes in
smuggling patterns.  The main disadvantage of these barriers is that they are easier
to compromise than permanent vehicle barriers.  
Current Status
In FY2007, DHS unveiled a new program, called SBInet,89 that will deploy a
mix of personnel, technology, infrastructure, and response assets in order to “provide
maximum tactical advantage in each unique border environment.”  While SBInet has
been billed as a nationwide initiative, its initial rollout has been confined to the
southwest border.  As part of SBInet, DHS awarded a contract to Boeing to serve as
the project’s lead technology integrator.  
The SBInet program has included the construction of barriers as part of its
approach to securing the border.  Boeing, in conjunction with the Sandia National
Laboratory, created a Fence Lab program to test the efficacy of 8 different fence
designs.90  In FY2007, CBP constructed a total of 76 miles of border fencing
bringing the overall fencing at the border to 154 miles.  In FY2008 through the end
of the calendar year, CBP is planning to construct an additional 216 miles of fencing;
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91 Presentation given by Rowdy Adams, SBI Deputy Executive Director, Department of
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92 From CBP Congressional Affairs, March 13, 2008,
93 Ibid.
94 Presentation given by Rowdy Adams, SBI Deputy Executive Director, Department of
Homeland Security, at the Border Management Summit, October 23, 2007.
95 Testimony of GAO Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues Richard Stana, in
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this would bring the overall fencing at the border to 370 miles by the end of calendar
year 2008.91  Through early April, 2008, CBP had constructed an additional 18 miles
of fencing, bringing the total milage of fencing constructed at the border to 172.92
The fencing that has been constructed thus far as part of SBInet has been primary
fencing, and a few different designs have been used, including bollard fencing.
While the National Guard was involved in some of the construction in FY2007,
much of it was undertaken by contractors.  In 2008, the majority of the fence
construction will be done by contractors.93
In FY2007, CBP constructed 110 miles of vehicle barriers.  Through early April
in 2008, CBP had constructed an additional 32 miles of vehicle barriers, bringing the
total vehicle barrier milage to 142.  CBP plans to build 158 additional miles of
vehicle barriers by the end of calendar year 2008; this would bring the overall total
milage of vehicle barriers at the border to 300.94
In testimony before the Appropriations Committee, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) noted that CBP’s goal for fencing and vehicle barrier
deployment in 2008 “will be challenging because of factors that include difficulties
acquiring rights to border land and an inability to estimate costs for installation.”95
Legislation in the 110th Congress
The issue of border security continues to be of interest to the 110th Congress.
The following sections describe a representative selection of the legislation enacted
or considered by Congress concerning barriers at the border.
Enacted Legislation
As previously noted, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-
161) made significant changes to the Secure Fence Act.  The Act gives DHS
discretion as to where fencing should be erected along the border, requires that 700
miles of reinforced fencing be constructed, and designates 370 miles as a priority area
that must be constructed by December 31, 2008.  In addition, the Act  provides a total
of $1,225 million for SBInet.  This represents an increase of $225 million over the
Administration’s request, and the amounts recommended by the House and Senate-
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about this, please refer to CRS Report RL34004,  Homeland Security Department: FY2008
Appropriations, Coordinated by Jennifer E. Lake and Blas Nuñez-Neto.
97 From e-mail correspondence with CBP, July 27, 2007.
passed versions of the bill.  Of the $1,225 million provided by P.L. 110-161, $1,053
million is designated as emergency funding, and $172 million is comprised of regular
appropriations.96  The $1,225 million is apportioned as follows: $1,088 million for
development and deployment ($1,053 million in emergency funding, and $35 million
in regular appropriations); $73 million for operation and maintenance; and $64
million for program management.  Funding for the construction of the border fence
is included in the development and deployment activity in the BSFIT account.
However, it is important to note that other items, such as the deployment of cameras
and sensors to the border, are also funded under this activity.  Currently available
authoritative documentation does not provide funding details below the activity level.
Therefore, the portion of this funding that would be specifically directed to the border
fence cannot be precisely determined.  However, according to CBP Congressional
Affairs, the President’s $1,000 million FY2008 request for BSFIT included $196
million in fence-related funding.97   P.L.110-161 also withholds $650 million of the
funding provided for SBInet until an expenditure plan is received and approved by
the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.
Proposed Legislation
In addition to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, a number of bills have been
introduced in the 110th Congress that included provisions relating to the construction
of border fencing.  Although the following analysis is not intended to provide a
comprehensive list of every bill introduced that had fencing provisions, it does
provide an overview of the main types of fence-related bills that have been
introduced and their overarching themes.  
Prior to enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, a number of other
bills were introduced in the 110th Congress that would expand or underlined the
Secretary of Homeland Security’s authority to construct fencing at the border.  H.R.
4192, H.R. 3638, and H.R. 2954 would direct the President to construct the fencing
authorized by the Secure Fence Act.  S. 2348 would authorize $3 billion in
emergency funding for a variety of border security purposes, including the
construction of 700 miles of fencing.  S. 2294 and S. 1984 would call for the
construction of 700 miles of fencing and 300 miles of vehicle barriers within two
years of enactment.  S. 1269 would call for the construction of double layer fencing
along the border from the Pacific Ocean to the Gulf of Mexico.  S. 330 would call for
replacing existing fencing in Tucson and Yuma sectors with double layer fencing and
constructing a total of 370 miles of fencing and 500 miles of vehicle barriers along
the border.
The issue of barriers at the border has also been of interest to the 110th  Congress
as a component of the larger immigration debate. During May and June 2007, the
Senate considered a number of comprehensive immigration reform measures (S.
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1348, S.Amdt. 1150 to S. 1348, S. 1639), though cloture was unable to be achieved
on any of these proposals.  Both S.Amdt. 1150, as amended, and S. 1639, as
introduced, included language concerning fencing at the border that was similar to
that which was ultimately enacted as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for
FY2008.98  
Some comprehensive immigration reform proposals considered also included
provisions requiring that the construction of border barriers serve as a trigger
mechanism for broader immigration reform to occur.  S.Amdt. 1150, as introduced,
would require the construction of 370 miles of fencing and 200 miles of vehicle
barriers before some provisions relating to legalization, adjustment of status, and
temporary workers could take effect.  In addition, S.Amdt. 1150 would amend §102
of IIRIRA to expressly authorize the construction of the San Diego fence.  During the
initial Senate floor debate for S.Amdt. 1150, S.Amdt. 1172 was adopted by
unanimous consent and amended the trigger mechanisms to require 300 miles of
vehicle barriers.  S. 1639, as introduced, included similar language to S.Amdt. 1150,
as amended, concerning barriers at the border.  S. 1639 would require DHS to
construct 370 miles of fencing and 300 miles of vehicle barriers as part of the trigger
mechanisms required before some provisions relating to legalization, adjustment of
status, and temporary workers could take effect.  S. 1369 would also expressly
authorize the completion of the San Diego fence.
A number of bills that have been introduced in the second session of the 110th
Congress  would amend the changes to the Secure Fence Act that were enacted by the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of FY2008.  H.R. 5568 would insert the word
“physical” before all previously enacted occurrences of the word “fencing” (e.g., in
the Secure Fence Act and §102 of IIRIRA).  S. 2712 would require that the 700 miles
of reinforced fencing authorized by the Consolidated Appropriations Act be
completed by December 31, 2010.  H.R. 5124 would require that the fencing
constructed under the Act’s authorization be double layer, at least 14 feet tall, and be
completed within six months of the bill’s enactment.  In addition, the bill would
prohibit DHS from counting fencing in existence prior to January 1, 2008, toward the
700-mile total.  H.R. 4987 would replace the 700-mile requirement enacted by the
Consolidated Appropriations Act and replace it with language, similar to that in the
original Secure Fence Act, requiring five specific stretches of fencing to be
constructed.  H.R. 4960 would repeal the consultation requirement enacted by the
Consolidated Appropriations Act.
Lastly, several introduced bills include other fencing provisions not directly
related to the construction of fencing.  H.R. 5728 would establish a Border
Improvement Trust Fund and allow taxpayers to designate $5 ($10 for joint filers)
from their annual income tax returns for this fund.  The fund could be used to pay for
costs associated with constructing and maintaining fencing and barriers at the border.
S. 2709 would impose a minimum sentence of five years for any alien convicted of
damaging fencing or infrastructure (including cameras and sensors) at the border.
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Legislation in the 109th Congress
The 109th Congress enacted three pieces of legislation concerning border
fencing, and considered several more.  The REAL ID Act (P.L. 109-13), as
previously noted, expanded DHS’ waiver authority to expedite the construction of
border fencing.  The Secure Fence Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-367) directed DHS to
construct five stretches of border fencing totaling roughly 850 miles.99  The FY2007
DHS Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-295) provided $1.2 billion for the installation of
fencing, infrastructure, and technology along the border; $31 million of this total was
designated for the completion of the San Diego fence.100  In addition to these Acts,
a number of bills with fencing related provisions were passed  by the House and the
Senate.  H.R. 4437, which would have directed DHS to construct five stretches of
fencing along the border, was passed by the House on December 16, 2005.  S. 2611,
which called for 370 miles of fencing to be constructed, was passed by the Senate on
May 25, 2006.  S.Amdt. 4788 was added to the Department of Defense Appropriation
bill, H.R. 5631, on August 2, 2006, and would have appropriated $1.8 billion to the
National Guard for the construction of border fencing.  H.R. 5631 was passed by the
Senate on September 7, 2006; however, this fencing provision was stripped from the
bill during conference.
P.L. 109-295, the FY2007 DHS Appropriations Act, provided $1.2 billion in
funding for border fencing, infrastructure, and technology; combined with the
supplemental appropriation provided by P.L. 109-234, the conferees noted that DHS
would have $1.5 billion for border infrastructure construction in FY2007.101  The
conferees directed DHS to submit an expenditure plan for this funding within 60 days
of the bill’s enactment, and withheld $950 million of the funding until the plan is
received and approved by the House and Senate Committees.  However, the Act did
not place any restrictions on how DHS is to apportion this appropriation between
fencing, infrastructure, and technology.    
In addition to the bills discussed above, there were a number of bills in the 109th
Congress that would have expanded the current fencing and other forms of barriers
at the international land border.  Some of these bills would have required fencing to
be constructed along the entire southwest border, others would have identified
particular stretches of land which would receive fencing, and still others would have
called for studies to determine whether fencing is a cost-effective way of securing the
border.102
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Issues For Congress
Congress may consider a number of policy issues concerning the construction
of barriers along the border, including, but not limited to, their effectiveness, overall
costs compared with benefits, possible diplomatic ramifications, unintended
consequences, and the locations in which they are to be constructed.  Although these
issues apply to all potential barriers at the border, due to the focus on border fencing
in the current congressional debate, this section will focus its analysis on the potential
policy issues surrounding the construction of fencing at the border.
Effectiveness
Proponents of border fences point to the substantial reduction in apprehensions
along the San Diego sector as tangible proof that fences succeed in reducing cross-
border smuggling and migration where they are constructed.103  Opponents attribute
part of the decrease in apprehensions to the increase in manpower and resources in
the sector and, pointing to the increase in apprehensions in less-populated sectors,
contend that the fence only succeeds in re-routing unauthorized migration and not in
stopping it.104  The USBP, for its part, states that border fencing is a force multiplier
because it allows its agents to focus enforcement actions in other areas.  The USBP
has also stated that the fencing constructed in urban areas has helped reroute
unauthorized migration to less populated areas where its agents have a tactical
advantage over border crossers.  As previously noted, the number of USBP
apprehensions in 2004 were almost identical to the number of apprehensions in 1992;
the main difference is that San Diego accounted for the majority of apprehensions in
1992, whereas in 2004 Tucson and Yuma sectors accounted for the majority of
apprehensions.
A possible issue for Congress concerns the overall effectiveness of border
fencing, especially if it is not constructed across the entire border in question.  In the
limited urban areas where border fencing has been constructed, it has typically
reduced apprehensions.  However, there is also strong indication that the fencing,
combined with added enforcement, has re-routed illegal immigrants to other less
fortified areas of the border.  Additionally, in the limited areas where fencing has
been erected, there have been numerous breaches of the border fencing and a number
of tunnels discovered crossing underneath the fencing.  It stands to reason that even
if border fencing is constructed over a significant portion of the land border, the
incidences of fence breaches and underground tunnels would increase.  Possible
policy options to address these issues could include mandating that border fencing
be highly tamper-resistant or directing CBP to invest in tunnel-detection
technologies.
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Costs
Because border fencing is a relatively new and limited phenomenon along the
U.S.-Mexico border, there is a dearth of information concerning its overall costs and
benefits.  The Corps of Engineers study predicted that the costs of constructing a
double layer fence consisting of primary fencing and Sandia fencing would range
from $1.2 million to $1.3 million a mile, excluding the costs of land acquisition.  The
Corps of Engineers also predicted that the 25-year life cycle cost of the fence would
range from $16.4 million to $70 million per mile depending on the amount of
damage sustained by the fencing.105  If significant portions of the border were to be
fenced, reducing the areas along which individuals could cross the border, it may
stand to reason that the fencing will be subjected to more breaches and other attempts
to compromise than the fencing that has already been constructed.  This may mean
that the costs of maintaining border fencing that is widely deployed in the future will
be higher than they have been thus far for the limited deployment.  The Corps
estimates do not include the costs of acquiring the land or most labor costs, since
construction would be done by DOD; these could well turn out to be significant
expenses if private contractors are used to construct the fencing as per DHS’ FY2007
Congressional Budget Justifications.  The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has
estimated that border fencing would cost $3 million a mile to construct and that
maintenance would total roughly 15% of the overall project costs per year.106
However, the CBO does not elaborate on what is included in those estimates.  DHS
predicts that the San Diego fence will have a total cost of $127 million for its 14-mile
length when it is completed — roughly $9 million a mile.  Construction of the first
9.5 miles of fencing cost $31 million, or roughly $3 million a mile, while
construction of the last 4.5 miles of fencing is projected to cost $96 million, or
roughly $21 million a mile.107  However these costs may be somewhat misleading
due to the following factors:  construction of the fence was delayed for an extended
period of time; the remaining construction involves filling a relatively large gulch
which may be more complex than the average stretch of border; and DHS is
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proposing to use private contractors to expedite the construction process which may
increase the labor costs and thus may increase the overall project costs.
Some have argued that building fences on the border is too expensive and would
consume funding that would be better spent on hiring additional agents or deploying
additional technologies to the border.108  Others maintain that the costs of fencing are
negligible compared to the costs of illegal immigration, and that fencing has been
proven effective at decreasing illegal immigration in those areas where it has been
deployed.109  The USBP has testified that “for border control, for border security, we
need that appropriate mix.  It’s not about fences. It’s not about Border Patrol agents.
It’s not about technology.  It’s about all of those things.”110  At issue for Congress is
how best to allocate scarce border security resources while safeguarding homeland
security.  Does border fencing represent the best investment of border security
funding, and what is the appropriate mix of border security resources?  How much
will maintaining border fencing cost in the future, and which agency will be
responsible for this maintenance?  Will using private contractors to expedite the
construction of border fencing increase or decrease the costs?  
Fence Design
Congress mandated the design of the border fence in San Diego in IIRIRA.
Many different fence designs could be deployed to the border, and each have their
relative strengths and weaknesses.  Concrete panels, for example, are among the
more cost-effective solutions but USBP agents cannot see through this type of
fencing; the USBP testified about their preference for fencing that can be seen
through, so as to identify the activity occurring on the Mexican side of the border and
thus preserve their tactical advantage over potential border crossers, and to better
avoid potential rockings111 or other violent incidents.  Sandia fencing has been
effective in San Diego and can be seen through, but is among the more expensive
fencing options.  Bollard fencing has been effective in its limited deployment and can
also be seen through, but is also expensive to install and to maintain.  Chain link
CRS-35
112 Fencing the Border hearing, July 20, 2006.
113 Fencing the Border hearing, July 20, 2006.
114 Interview with CBP Congressional Affairs, September 13, 2006.
fencing is relatively economical, but more easily compromised.112  If fencing is to be
constructed along the border, an issue concerns what kinds of fencing should be
constructed in order to maximize its deterrent effect and its utility to the USBP while
minimizing the costs associated with its construction and maintenance. 
Fence Location
The USBP has testified that border fencing is most effective for its operational
purposes when deployed along urban areas.113  In these areas, individuals crossing the
border have a short distance to cover before disappearing into neighborhoods; once
they have entered neighborhoods it is much more difficult for USBP agents to
identify and apprehend unauthorized aliens.  Also, from populated areas it is
relatively easy for unauthorized aliens to find transportation into the interior.  For
these reasons, all of the border fencing constructed by the USBP to date has been
built in urban areas abutting the border, such as San Diego, Nogales, and El Paso.
In rural areas, the USBP testified that it has a tactical advantage over border crossers
because they must travel longer distances before reaching populated areas.
According to CBP, fencing is manpower intensive because agents must continually
check the fence for breaches and for illegal activity.  This does not represent a
problem in urban areas, because the USBP stations are typically located near the
border in those areas. In some of the more rural areas of the border, where the nearest
towns and USBP stations may be many miles away from the border, this would mean
that agents would need to spend much of their working day commuting from the
nearest USBP station to the fence location.114  Additionally, because the border
fencing constructed to date has been built along urban areas it has been relatively
easy to house the individuals involved in its construction.  If border fencing is
extended into the more remote areas of the border, the costs of its construction may
increase due to the need to bring the individuals and goods needed to build the fence
to these areas for extended periods of time.  Lastly, some areas of the border are
prone to severe weather effects, such as flash flooding, that could compromise any
permanent structures constructed there.
A very practical issue concerns what areas of the border should be fenced.
Should fencing be restricted to urban or semi-urban areas in order to give the USBP
a tactical advantage over border crossers, or should fencing be constructed along any
geographical area of the border that features large numbers of unauthorized
immigration?  In rural areas, should fencing be limited to areas of high illegal entry
in order to impede individuals from crossing the border, or should fencing be
constructed as a deterrent in any area, even those featuring low levels of illegal entry?
Should fencing be deployed in sectors where the distance between the nearest USBP
station and the fence requires agents to spend most of their day commuting?  Should
fencing be deployed to the northern border as well as the southwest border?  Will
building fencing along more remote or environmentally harsher areas of the border
increase the construction costs?
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Land Acquisition
There are a number of issues associated with the acquisition of the land that
would be required for border fencing.  Much of the land along the California and
Arizona border is owned by the federal government; however most of the land along
the Texas border is owned by private individuals.  What will the costs of acquiring
the land to construct border fencing be, and have these costs been factored into
estimates of border fencing costs?  Will eminent domain be used to confiscate land
from individuals who do not wish to have fencing built on their lands?   
The reservations made by Presidents Roosevelt and Taft may have kept
substantial parcels of land within the federal domain, depending mostly on the
amount of public lands at the time and valid existing claims. CRS was not able to
determine how many valid claims and land patents exist, if any, or the number of
private developments that may be encroaching on the reservations.  Nonetheless, it
appears that only those who qualify under an exception or were provided land by
statute have valid fee title claims within the reserved strip.  If lands were mistakenly
granted, sold, or transferred to private parties, these conveyances could be void
because, as a general rule, rights can not be acquired in lands actually embraced in
a legally valid withdrawal.115  Compensation under the Fifth Amendment for private
landowners may not be owed if private claims are not legitimate.  Because the
proclamations do not cite any supporting authority, some question the President’s
implied or inherent constitutional powers to issue them.116  Others may argue that
they conflict with the exclusive mandate given Congress by the Property Clause of
the Constitution to regulate and dispose of federal property.117  An issue for Congress
may include whether these proclamations are, in fact, valid, and if so what actions are
appropriate to take in the instances where individuals own land within the
reservation’s boundaries.  Assuming the proclamations are valid, the reservations
may provide the first 60 feet of necessary space for fence construction in many areas.
However, the two layer fencing constructed to date includes 150 feet of land between
its layers.  An issue for Congress may involve whether to confine border fencing to
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the 60-feet easement reserved by the proclamations, or whether to acquire the
additional 90 feet of land that would be needed to construct Sandia-style fencing.
A corollary issue may involve the authority of DHS to construct border fencing
along tribal lands.  The Arizona desert along the Tohono O’odham reservation has
become one of the most heavily trafficked border areas in the country, and the USBP
has been restricted in its operations in the reservation due to tribal concerns.118 The
Tohono O’odham have reportedly vowed to fight the construction of fencing on
tribe-owned land, citing environmental and cultural concerns.119  Under current law,
the Secretary of the Interior may grant rights-of-way over and across tribal land,
provided the Secretary receives prior written consent of the tribe.120  If the tribe does
not consent, DHS may look to its new waiver authority to construct a fence across
tribal lands.  It is unclear, however, whether the expanded waiver that was given to
the Secretary of DHS would allow (or was intended to allow) the Department to
override the statutory authority given to another federal agency.  Ultimately, federal
government holds all Indian lands in trust, and Congress may take such lands for
public purposes, as long as it provides just compensation as required by the Fifth
Amendment.121 
Diplomatic Ramifications 
The governments of Mexico and Canada have both voiced concern about the
United States constructing barriers along the international border.  Mexican President
Vicente Fox has come out strongly against the construction of border barriers on
numerous occasions, stating his belief that these projects isolate the two nations,
create frustration and misunderstandings, and do not solve the underlying problems
that lead individuals to enter the United States illegally.  Mexican Press Secretary
Rubén Aguilar Valenzuela stated his government’s belief that “history has also taught
us that a wall is never the solution to problems and that all walls eventually get torn
down.”122  The Mexican government has reportedly forwarded numerous diplomatic
notes to the White House registering its complaints against the possible expansion
of border fencing.  The Canadian government has also reportedly voiced concern
over legislative proposals that would require a study of fencing options along the
northern border, citing the difficulties of fencing the northen border and the fact that
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the U.S. government has never discussed such a plan with Canadian authorities.123
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement John P. Clark
reportedly stated during Congressional testimony that the proposed expansion of
border fencing “harkens back to the Chinese wall and the Berlin Wall, not the
message we want to send to the Mexican government, the Canadian government, and
the rest of the world.”124  There are a number of  possible issues for Congress to
consider involving the potential diplomatic ramifications of constructing barriers
along the border: Do the gains in border security outweigh the risk of alienating
Mexico and Canada?  Should the Mexican or Canadian government’s opinions or
wishes be taken into account when border fencing is concerned?  Given the need to
coordinate intelligence and law enforcement activities at the border, should
maintaining cordial working relationships with Mexico and Canada take precedence
over sealing the border with physical barriers?
Environmental Considerations
A great deal of debate has been around the environmental impacts of border
fencing.  The addition of fences along the southwest border, according to some, could
harm sensitive environments, adversely affect critical habitat for protected species,
and block migratory patterns for animals.  Indeed, these concerns were among the
many voiced by the CCC in its objection to the completion of the San Diego border
fence. After immigration officials, the CCC, and the environmental community could
not agree on a fence design, Congress passed waiver language in the REAL ID Act
that allows the Secretary of DHS to waive all “legal requirements” necessary to
ensure expeditious construction of the barriers and roads in the vicinity of the U.S.
border.  The Secretary used this provision to waive a number of primarily
environmental laws (see Appendix A) in order to complete the San Diego border
fence.  DHS maintains, however, that it will follow “best management practices”
throughout construction and will be “mindful of the environmental impacts” that
might occur.125  Nonetheless, the Secretary’s broad waiver authority has many
worried about potential fence projects along other areas of the southwest border.
Some argue that a fence along the Arizona border could be especially destructive to
endangered jaguar and Sonoran desert pronghorn populations that usually roam this
area because it would fragment native habitat and ultimately reduce gene pools.126
Officials from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, however, have said that it is too
early to speculate about the potential impact of a border fence on wildlife
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migration.127  Others note that unauthorized migration negatively impacts the
environment, and believe that the construction of fencing could actually have a
beneficial impact for protected lands if it reduces the number of unauthorized
migrants traversing through environmentally sensitive lands.
As Congress debates immigration reform and the addition of new border fences,
Members will undoubtedly be called upon to balance national security interests with
environmental protections.  Because there does not appear to be a clear consensus on
the environmental impacts of border fencing, there is some interest in a study of the
issue.128  The effects of the San Diego border fence, for example, may help scientists
better understand and predict potential environmental consequences elsewhere.
Should fencing be expanded along the southwest border, Congress may be interested
in environmentally sensitive alternatives to normal fencing and whether they can
effectively limit illegitimate cross-border traffic.  Some argue that vehicle barriers
may be less intrusive because they allow unimpeded wildlife movement but can limit
damaging vehicular traffic.129  Congress may also call on the Secretary to cooperate
or coordinate certain activities with the environmental community, since the
Secretary could waive many environmental requirements.130
Legal Considerations
The building of barriers along the international border has raised a number of
legal issues.  Most stem from requirements posed by environmental laws.  Before the
passage of the REAL ID Act waiver provision, for example, the Sierra Club and other
environmental groups challenged, under the National Environmental Policy Act, the
federal government’s plan to complete the San Diego border fence.131  The lawsuit
alleged, among other things, that the government’s final environmental impact
statement did not address the entire 14-mile border infrastructure system and
inadequately addressed the parts that were evaluated.  After Secretary Chertoff
exercised the waiver authority, the court dismissed the environmentalists’ lawsuit in
December 2005. 
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With respect to the Secretary’s use of the waiver authority, the provision allows
legal redress only for constitutional violations and limits review to the district courts
of the United States (though the Supreme Court retains discretionary appellate review
over district court decisions).  In essence, an individual could not sue DHS for
bypassing the environmental impact statement requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act (a law it has waived) because that would be a statutory
violation, but an individual could sue for the taking of property without “just
compensation” as provided by the Fifth Amendment. Should a district court make a
ruling, that decision can only be appealed if the petitioner files a petition for a writ
of certiorari to the Supreme Court and the Court, in its discretion, chooses to grant
certiorari.  In other words, there is no intermediate appellate court review guaranteed
as of right to a petitioner.  Appeal directly from a district court to the Supreme Court
rarely appears in law.132  Still, when Congress determines a particular class of cases
to be of great public import, it is not unprecedented for it to require prompt review
in the highest court of the land.  As previously discussed, the Sierra Club and
Defenders of Wildlife  brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia in late 2007, challenging the constitutionality of the waiver authority
provided to the Secretary of Homeland Security by the REAL ID Act, but the court
rejected plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge and dismissed the claim.133 Consequently,
the plaintiffs have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court,
which is still pending.
Unintended Consequences
Considerable evidence shows that the USBP’s historical strategy of “Prevention
through Deterrence,” whereby agents and resources including border fencing and
other barriers have been concentrated along urban areas and areas traditionally
featuring high levels of illegal entry, has succeeded in changing the flow of illegal
migration.  While San Diego, CA, and El Paso, TX, were historically the two sectors
that featured the most apprehensions and the highest levels of illegal immigration,
since the mid-1990s and the advent of Operations Gatekeeper and Hold the Line in
those sectors, the more remote geographical areas of the Arizona border have become
the hot-spots for illegal migration into the United States.  One unintended
consequence of this enforcement posture and the shift in migration patterns has been
an increase in the number of migrant deaths each year; on average 200 migrants died
each year in the early 1990s, compared with 472 migrant deaths in 2005.   Another
unintended consequence of this enforcement posture may have been a relative
increase, compared with the national average, in crime along the border in these more
remote regions.  While crime rates in San Diego and El Paso have declined over the
past 15 years, the reduction in crime rates along the more rural areas of the border
have lagged behind the national trends.  Another unintended consequence of the
border fencing has been the proliferation of tunnels dug underneath the border.  In
San Diego, where the double-layer Sandia fencing has been constructed, smugglers
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have dug numerous tunnels underneath the border fence. One such tunnel was almost
a kilometer long and was built from reinforced concrete — evidence of a rather
sophisticated smuggling operation.
A possible issue for Congress to consider as it debates expanding the existing
border fencing is what the unintended consequences of this expansion could be.
Given the re-routing of migration flows that have already occurred, are DHS and the
relevant border communities prepared to handle the increased flow of illegal
migration to non-reinforced areas?  Is DHS prepared to deal with an increase in the
phenomenon of cross-border tunnels and other attempts to defeat the purpose of the
fencing?  What will the impact on crime rates be along the unreinforced areas of the
border?  Will USBP agents be required to spend some of their patrolling time
guarding the fence?
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Appendix A. Examples of USBP Border Fencing
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Environmental
Assessment for Infrastructure Within U.S. Border Patrol Naco-Douglas Corridor Cochise County,
Arizona, August, 2000, p. 1-13.
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Appendix B. The San Diego Fence
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Environmental Impact Statement for the
Completion of the 14-Mile Border Infrastructure System San Diego, California, July 2003.
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Appendix C. Permanent Vehicle Barrier Schematic
Source: U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Proposed Vehicle Barrier
Environmental Assessment, April, 2003.  
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Appendix D. Permanent Vehicle Barriers
Source: CBP Congressional Affairs.
CRS-46
Appendix E. Data from Figure 4
FY1992 FY1993 FY1994 FY1995 FY1996 FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004
Other San Diego
Sector Stations
204,456 210,129 155,386 262,505 297,423 189,321 160,781 140,640 113,866 85,815 87,195 96,752 119,293
Chula Vista
Station
158,952 156,273 107,872 141,096 111,413 67,804 72,648 27,085 19,453 9,627 3,080 4,545 9,923
Imperial Beach
Station
202,173 165,287 186,894 120,630 74,979 27,865 15,832 15,974 19,815 15,480 11,405 10,218 9,112
Tucson 71,036 92,639 139,473 227,529 305,348 272,397 387,406 470,449 616,346 449,675 333,648 347,263 490,827
Source: CRS Presentation of CBP data.
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Appendix F. Legal Requirements Waived by DHS for the Construction of 
the San Diego Border Fence 
Laws Waived General Requirements
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
16 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq.
Under NEPA, an environmental impact statement must be prepared for “every recommendation or report
on proposals for legislation and other major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.” If an agency is uncertain whether an action’s impacts on the environment will be significant,
it usually prepares an environmental assessment (EA). An EA is carried out to clarify issues and determine
the extent of an action’s environmental effects. NEPA also has public notice and comment requirements.
Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq.
Section 7 of the ESA mandates that each federal agency consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
or National Marine Fishery Services (NMFS), depending on the listed species involved, to ensure that its
actions are “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species,
or result in the destruction or adverse modification of” designated critical habitat. Once consulted, FWS or
NMFS must, if listed endangered species might be affected, prepare a biological opinion to determine the
actual impact of the proposed action. Mitigation measures could be required.
Costal Zone Management Act (CZMA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 1451 et seq.
The CZMA requires federal agency activity within or outside the coastal zone that affects any land or water
use or natural resource of the coastal zone to be carried out in a manner that is consistent to the maximum
extent practicable with the policies of an approved state management program.  The federal agency must
submit a consistency determination to the applicable state agency. 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
(Clean Water Act)
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act establishes a program to regulate the discharge of dredged or fill material
into waters of the United States, including wetlands. Section 404 requires a permit before dredged or fill
material may be discharged into waters of the United States, unless the activity is exempt.
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 470 et seq.
In accordance with the NHPA and its implementing regulations, 36 CFR Part 800, sites determined to be
eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places must be protected, either through avoidance
or other mitigative action, from direct and indirect impacts.  The NHPA also has procedural requirements,
including public notice and comment.
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Laws Waived General Requirements
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MTBA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 703 et seq.
Section 2 of the MTBA sets out the types of prohibited conduct and states: “Unless and except as permitted
by regulations ... it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means, or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take,
capture, kill, attempt to do these acts, [or] possess ... any migratory bird, [or] any part, nest, or eggs of any
such bird....” Violations of the MTBA may result in civil or criminal penalties.
Clean Air Act (CAA)
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq.
The Clean Air Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency to establish minimum national standards
for air quality, known as National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), and assigns primary
responsibility to the states to assure compliance with the standards.  Areas not meeting the standards, referred
to as “nonattainment areas,” are required to implement specified air pollution control measures. Federal
actions located in NAAQS nonattainment areas must comply with the federal general air conformity rule set
forth by the CAA and codified in 40 CFR Part 51. The general conformity rule requires federal agencies to
ensure that actions undertaken in nonattainment or maintenance areas are consistent with the applicable state
plan.  The states administer the CAA through a comprehensive permitting program.
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.
The APA establishes the general procedures that an agency must follow when promulgating a legislative
rule. An agency must publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register, afford interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the proceeding through the submission of written comments or, at
the discretion of the agency, by oral presentation, and when consideration of the matter is completed,
incorporate in the rules adopted “a concise general statement of their basis and purpose.” A final rule must
be published in the Federal Register “not less than 30 days before its effective date.”
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Appendix G.  Legal Requirements Waived by DHS for the Construction of Physical Barriers
and Roads in the Vicinity of the Barry M. Goldwater Range in Southwest Arizona
Laws Waived General Requirements
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
16 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
(Clean Water Act)
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
Wilderness Act , 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131 et seq. The Wilderness Act established a National Wilderness Preservation System on federal lands “where the earth
and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.”
Within designated wilderness areas, section 4(c) of the Act generally prohibits structures or installations,
motor vehicle or other forms of mechanical transport, and temporary roads.
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 470 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
National Wildlife Refuge System Administration
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee.
The National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS) was primarily established to ensure the conservation of fish,
wildlife, and plants. Designated areas may be used for other purposes (e.g., hunting, timber harvest, and
grazing) only to the extent that such activities are compatible with the purposes for which the refuge was
created.  The refuges are managed by the Fish and Wildlife Service.
Military Lands Withdrawal Act of 1999 (P.L.
106-65, 113 Stat. 885 (Oct. 5, 1999).
The Military Lands Withdrawal Act of 1999 withdrew the lands within the Barry M. Goldwater Range and
generally reserved such lands to the Secretaries of the Air Force and the Navy for military purposes.  The
Secretaries of the Air Force, Navy, and Interior were required to establish an integrated natural resource plan
(INRP) which, among other things, provided that “all gates, fences, and barriers constructed on such
lands...be designed and erected to allow wildlife access, to the extent practicable and consistent with military
security, safety, and sound wildlife management use.”
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Laws Waived General Requirements
Sikes Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 670 et seq. The Sikes Act requires the Secretary of Defense to carry out a program providing for the conservation and
rehabilitation of natural resources on military installations (e.g., public lands withdrawn or reserved for use
by a military department), pursuant to an INRP prepared in cooperation with the Secretary of the Interior.
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
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Appendix H.  Legal Requirements Waived by DHS for the Construction of Physical Barriers
and Roads in the Vicinity of the San Pedro Riparian National Conservation Area 
in Southeast Arizona
Laws Waived General Requirements
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
16 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
(Clean Water Act)
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 470 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MTBA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 703 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
Clean Air Act (CAA)
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
Archeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa et seq.
The Archeological Resources Protection Act generally prohibits the damage, removal, excavation, or
alteration of any archeological resource located on public lands or Indian lands, except pursuant to a permit
issued by the appropriate federal land manager.
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)
42 U.S.C. §§ 300f et seq.
The Safe Drinking Water Act provides federal authority for the establishment of standards and treatment
requirements for public water supplies, control of the underground injection of wastes, and protection of
sources of drinking water.  Federal agencies involved in certain activities that may contaminate drinking
water are subject to all federal, state, and local requirements concerning the protection of water systems to
the same extent as any person is subject to such requirements.
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Laws Waived General Requirements
Noise Control Act (NCA)
42 U.S.C. §§ 4901 et seq.
Pursuant to the Noise Control Act, the federal government has established standards for maximum sound
levels generated from a variety of products. In addition, section 4 of the NCA requires federal agencies,
subject to presidential exemption, to comply with federal, state, interstate, and local requirements respecting
control and abatement of environmental noise to the same extent that any person is subject to such
requirements.
Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), as amended by
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA)
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq.
Through the SWDA, as amended by RCRA, entities that transport or produce solid or hazardous waste are
required to comply with regulations concerning the management, production, and storage of waste.
Moreover, each federal agency engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the disposal or
management of solid waste or hazardous waste is subject to all federal, state, and local requirements
concerning such waste to the same extent as any person is subject to such requirements.
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq.
CERCLA established broad federal authority to respond to the release or threatened release of hazardous
substances.  Among other things, it established requirements for closed and abandoned hazardous waste sites,
and provided for liability of persons responsible for the release of hazardous waste at these locations.
Federal agencies and instrumentalities are subject to these requirements to the same extent as
nongovernmental entities, including with respect to liability.
Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA) 
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq.
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act establishes guidelines for the management and protection of
federal public lands, as administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the Bureau of Land
Management (in coordination with the Secretary of Agriculture with respect to lands in the National Forest
System), and imposes procedural requirements for land transfers and exchanges.  In developing land use
plans, the Secretary is required to consider protection of areas of critical environmental concern and
compliance with federal and state pollution control laws.  The Secretary of the Interior, with respect to the
public lands, and, the Secretary of Agriculture, with respect to lands within the National Forest System, are
authorized to grant rights-of-way  through such lands to other federal agencies, subject to terms and
conditions imposed by the Secretary authorizing the right-of-way.
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Laws Waived General Requirements
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (FWCA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 661 et seq.
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act generally provides that whenever the waters of any stream or other
body of water are proposed to be modified by a federal agency, the agency must first consult with the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, and the head of the agency exercising
administration over the wildlife resources of the state where the construction will occur, with a view to the
conservation of wildlife resources.
Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act
(AHPA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 469 et seq.
The purpose of the Archeological and Historical Preservation Act is to provide for the preservation of
historical and archeological data which might otherwise be irreparably lost or destroyed as the result of,
among other things, any alteration of terrain caused by a federal construction project.  If a federal agency
becomes aware that its activities in connection with a construction project may cause irreparable loss or
destruction of significant scientific, prehistorical, historical, or archeological data, the agency must notify
the Secretary of the Interior.  If the Secretary deems such data to be significant and in danger of being
irrevocably lost or destroyed, he is authorized to take action to protect and recover it.
Antiquities Act 
16 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq.
The Antiquities Act authorizes the President to declare as national monuments historic landmarks, historic
and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest.  This land is then withdrawn
from any other use.  The Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, and the Army may issue permits to qualified
scientific or educational institutions for the excavation of archaeological sites and gathering of objects of
antiquity on lands under their respective jurisdictions.  Penalties are provided for damaging resources
protected under the Act.
Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act
(HSBAA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 461 et seq.
The Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act declares it the national policy to preserve histories, sites,
buildings, and objects of national significance.  The Secretary of the Interior, through the National Park
Service, is charged with implementing the policy of the HSBAA, including through the acquisition,
maintenance, administration of  historic sites.  Persons who violate any rules or regulations promulgated
under the HSBAA may be subject to a fine.
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Laws Waived General Requirements
Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act of 1988 
16 U.S.C.§§  460xx et seq.
The Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act established the San Pedro Riparian National Conservation Area,
consisting of public lands surrounding the San Pedro River in Cochise County, Arizona.  The Secretary of
the Interior is responsible for managing the area in a manner that conserves and protects its wildlife and other
resources.  The Secretary may only permit uses of the conservation area that are determined to further the
primary purposes for which the conservation area was established. Except in limited circumstances,
motorized vehicles are permitted only on designated roads.  Persons who violate the Act or its implementing
regulations are subject to a fine and/or imprisonment.
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1281 et seq.
The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act establishes a National Wild and Scenic Rivers System (System) protecting
rivers and adjacent lands with important scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural,
or other similar values. Components of the System are to be administered in a manner that protects and
enhances the free-flowing and undeveloped nature of areas covered by the Act.  
Farmland Protection Policy Act (FPPA)
7 U.S.C. §§ 4201 et seq.
The Farmland Protection Policy Act requires the Department of Agriculture, in cooperation with other
federal entities, to develop criteria for identifying the effects of federal programs on the conversion of
farmland to nonagricultural uses.  Federal agencies are thereafter required to use this criteria to identify
farmland that is converted by federal programs and take into account the adverse effects of such programs
on the preservation of farmland.  Agencies must consider alternative actions, as appropriate, that could lessen
such adverse effects.
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. 
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
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Appendix I. Legal Requirements Waived by DHS for the Construction of Physical Barriers and
Roads in Hidalgo County, Texas
Laws Waived General Requirement
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
16 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
(Clean Water Act)
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 470 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MTBA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 703 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
Clean Air Act (CAA)
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
Archeological Resources Protection Act
(ARPA) 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)
42 U.S.C. §§ 300f et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
Noise Control Act (NCA)
42 U.S.C. §§ 4901 et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
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Laws Waived General Requirement
Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), as amended
by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA)
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA) 
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (FWCA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 661 et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act
(AHPA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 469 et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
Antiquities Act 
16 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act
(HSBAA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 461 et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
Farmland Protection Policy Act (FPPA)
7 U.S.C. §§ 4201 et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. 
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
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Laws Waived General Requirement
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 1451 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
National Wildlife Refuge System
Administration Act
16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee
See Appendix G for description of requirements.
Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956
16 U.S.C. §§ 742a et seq.
The Fish and Wildlife Act establishes a comprehensive national fish, shellfish, and wildlife resources
policy. The law requires the Secretary of Interior to develop measures for “maximum sustainable
production of fish,” make economic studies of the industry and recommend measures to insure the stability
of fisheries, take steps “required for the development, management, advancement, conservation and
protection of the fisheries resources,” and take steps “required for the development, management,
advancement, conservation, and protection of fish and wildlife resources” through research, acquisition of
land or water, development of existing facilities, and other means.
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899
33 U.S.C. § 403
The Rivers and Harbors Act makes it a misdemeanor to discharge refuse into the navigable waters of the
United States without a permit. It also makes it a misdemeanor to excavate, fill, or alter the course,
condition, or capacity of any port, harbor, channel, or other area within the reach of the Act without a
permit.
Eagle Protection Act
16 U.S.C. §§ 668 et seq.
The Eagle Protection Act provides for the protection of the bald eagle and the golden eagle by prohibiting
the taking, possession, and commerce of such birds. 
Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA)
25 U.S.C. §§ 3001 et seq.
The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act requires federal agencies and institutions
receiving federal funding to return Native American cultural items and human remains to their respective
people. If federal officials anticipate that activities on federal and tribal land might have an effect on
American Indian burial, or their activities inadvertently discover such burials, they must consult with
American Indian tribal officials as part of their compliance duties.
American Indian Religious Freedom Act
(AIRFA)
42 U.S.C. § 1996
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act ensures American Indian groups access to religious sites by
directing federal agencies to consult with American Indian spiritual leaders to determine appropriate
procedures to protect access and other religious rights.
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Laws Waived General Requirement
Religious Freedom Restoration Act
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act mandates that strict scrutiny be applied when a violation of the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is committed by a federal actor. 
Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act
of 1977
31 U.S.C. §§ 6303-6305
The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act governs the use of “non-standard” agreements, such as
grants or cooperative agreements offered by federal agencies. This Act imposes standards mandating the
use of procurement contracts in some situations while allowing the use of non-standard agreements in other
situations.
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Appendix J. Legal Requirements Waived by DHS for the Construction of Physical Barriers and
Roads at Various Project Areas Located in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas
Laws Waived General Requirement
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
16 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
(Clean Water Act)
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 470 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MTBA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 703 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
Clean Air Act (CAA)
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
Archeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA) 16
U.S.C. §§ 470aa et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)
42 U.S.C. §§ 300f et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
Noise Control Act (NCA)
42 U.S.C. §§ 4901 et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
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Laws Waived General Requirement
Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), as amended by the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA)
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) 
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (FWCA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 661 et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act (AHPA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 469 et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
Antiquities Act 
16 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act (HSBAA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 461 et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
Farmland Protection Policy Act (FPPA)
7 U.S.C. §§ 4201 et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. 
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 1451 et seq.
See Appendix F for description of requirements.
National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act
16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee
See Appendix G for description of requirements.
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Laws Waived General Requirement
Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956
16 U.S.C. §§ 742a et seq.
See Appendix I for description of requirements.
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899
33 U.S.C. § 403
See Appendix I for description of requirements.
Eagle Protection Act
16 U.S.C. §§ 668 et seq.
See Appendix I for description of requirements.
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
(NAGPRA)
25 U.S.C. §§ 3001 et seq.
See Appendix I for description of requirements.
American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA)
42 U.S.C. § 1996
See Appendix I for description of requirements.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb
See Appendix I for description of requirements.
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
16 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq.
See Appendix H for description of requirements.
The Wilderness Act
16 U.S.C. §§ 1131a et seq.
See Appendix G for description of requirements.
Otay Mountain Wilderness Act of 1999
P.L. 106-145
The Otay Mountain Wilderness Act designates certain public lands in California as “wilderness”
to be protected under the Wilderness Act. Any lands acquired by the United States within the
designated area shall become part of the “wilderness area” and subject to the protections of the
Wilderness Act.
Section 102(29) and 103 of Title I of the California
Desert Protection Act
P.L. 103-433, 50 Stat. 1827
The California Desert Protection Act designates certain lands within the Inyo National Forest as
“wilderness” to be protected under the Wilderness Act. 
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Laws Waived General Requirement
National Park Service General Authorities Act
16 U.S.C. §§ 1a-1 et seq.
The National Park Service General Authorities Act is the organic statute for the National Parks
Service. The Act calls for the preservation of certain lands and empowers the National Parks
Service to issue regulations and manage these lands.
Sections 401(7), 403, and 404 of the National Parks and
Recreation Act 0f 1978
P.L. 95-625
The National Parks and Recreation Act designates the Organ Pipe Cactus Sational Monument in
Arizona as “wilderness” to be administered under the Wilderness Act.
Sections 301(a)-(f) of the Arizona Desert Wilderness Act
P.L. 101-628
The Arizona Desert Wilderness Act designates certain lands in the Havasu National Wildlife
Refuge, Imperial National Wildlife Refuge, Kofa National Wildlife Refuge, and Cabeza Prieta
National Wildlife Refuge (all in Arizona) as components of the National Wilderness Preservation
System to be administered under the Wilderness Act.
National Forest Management Act of 1976
16 U.S.C. §§ 1600 et seq.
The National Forest Management Act is the organic statute for the National Parks Service. It
empowers the Secretary of the Interior to administer the national park system.
Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act of 1960
16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531
The Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act declares that national forests are for outdoor recreation,
range, timber, watershed, and fish and wildlife purposes. It seeks to ensure that the national forest
are managed in furtherance of these purposes and in a sustainable manner.
Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA)
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq.
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 SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE 
Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet Program 
Implementation 
Highlights of GAO-08-131T, a testimony 
before the subcommittee on Management, 
Investigation, and Oversight, and Border, 
Maritime and Global Counterterrorism, 
Committee on Homeland Security, House 
of Representatives 
In November 2005, the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) 
established the Secure Border 
Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, 
multibillion dollar program to 
secure U.S. borders. One element 
of SBI is SBInet—the U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP) 
program responsible for developing 
a comprehensive border protection 
system through a mix of security 
infrastructure (e.g., fencing), and 
surveillance and communication 
technologies (e.g., radars, sensors, 
cameras, and satellite phones).  
 
The House Committee on 
Homeland Security asked GAO to 
monitor DHS progress in 
implementing the SBInet program. 
This testimony provides GAO’s 
observations on (1) SBInet 
technology implementation; (2) 
SBInet infrastructure 
implementation; (3) the extent to 
which CBP has determined the 
impact of SBInet technology and 
infrastructure on its workforce 
needs and operating procedures; 
and (4) how the CBP SBI Program 
Management Office (PMO) has 
defined its human capital goals and 
the progress it has made to achieve 
these goals.  GAO’s observations 
are based on analysis of DHS 
documentation, such as program 
schedules, contracts, status, and 
reports. GAO also conducted 
interviews with DHS officials and 
contractors, and visits to sites in 
the southwest border where SBInet 
deployment is underway. GAO 
performed the work from April 
2007 through October 2007. DHS 
generally agreed with GAO’s 
findings. 
DHS has made some progress to implement Project 28—the first segment of 
SBInet technology across the southwest border, but it has fallen behind its 
planned schedule.  The SBInet contractor delivered the components (i.e., 
radars, sensors and cameras) to the Project 28 site in Tucson, Arizona on 
schedule. However, Project 28 is incomplete more than 4 months after it was 
to become operational—at which point Border Patrol agents were to begin 
using SBInet technology to support their activities. According to DHS, the 
delays are primarily due to software integration problems. In September 2007, 
DHS officials said that the Project 28 contractor was making progress in 
correcting the problems, but DHS was unable to specify a date when the 
system would be operational. Due to the slippage in completing Project 28, 
DHS is revising the SBInet implementation schedule for follow-on technology 
projects, but still plans to deploy technology along 387 miles of the southwest 
border by December 31, 2008. DHS is also taking steps to strengthen its 
contract management for Project 28.  
 
SBInet infrastructure deployment along the southwest border is on schedule, 
but meeting CBP’s goal to have 370 miles of pedestrian fence and 200 miles of 
vehicle barriers in place by December 31, 2008, may be challenging and more 
costly than planned. CBP met its intermediate goal to deploy 70 miles of new 
fencing in fiscal year 2007 and the average cost per mile was $2.9 million. The 
SBInet PMO estimates that deployment costs for remaining fencing will be 
similar to those thus far.  In the past, DHS has minimized infrastructure 
construction labor costs by using Border Patrol agents and Department of 
Defense military personnel.  However, CBP officials report that they plan to 
use commercial labor for future fencing projects.  The additional cost of 
commercial labor and potential unforeseen increases in contract costs suggest 
future deployment could be more costly than planned. DHS officials also 
reported other challenging factors they will continue to face for infrastructure 
deployment, including community resistance, environmental considerations, 
and difficulties in acquiring rights to land along the border.  
  
The impact of SBInet on CBP’s workforce needs and operating procedures 
remains unclear because the SBInet technology is not fully identified or 
deployed. CBP officials expect the number of Border Patrol agents required to 
meet mission needs to change from current projections, but until the system is 
fully deployed, the direction and magnitude of the change is unknown. For the 
Tucson sector, where Project 28 is being deployed, Border Patrol officials are 
developing a plan on how to integrate SBInet into their operating procedures. 
 
The SBI PMO tripled in size during fiscal year 2007, but fell short of its staffing 
goal of 270 employees. Agency officials expressed concerns that staffing 
shortfalls could affect the agency’s capacity to provide adequate contractor 
oversight. In addition, the SBInet PMO has not yet completed long-term 
human capital planning.  
 
To view the full product, including the scope 
and methodology, click on GAO-08-131T. 
For more information, contact Richard M. 
Stana at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. 
 
 
Chairman Sanchez, Mr. Souder, Chairman Carney, Mr. Rogers and 
Members of the Subcommittees: 
 
I am pleased to be here today to discuss observations on selected aspects 
of the Secure Border Initiative’s SBInet program implementation.   
 
Securing the nation’s borders from illegal entry of aliens and contraband, 
including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a 
major concern. Much of the United States’ 6,000 miles of international 
borders with Canada and Mexico remains vulnerable to illegal entry. 
Although the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) apprehends 
hundreds of thousands of people entering the country illegally each year, 
several hundreds of thousands of individuals also enter the United States 
illegally and undetected. In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of 
the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion dollar program 
aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. Elements 
of SBI will be carried out by several organizations within DHS. One 
element of SBI is SBInet. Under SBInet, the U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) is responsible for developing a comprehensive border 
protection system.  
 
You requested that we monitor the SBInet program and provide periodic 
updates on the status of the program. My testimony today is the first in a 
series of interim reports on SBInet implementation and focuses on the 
following issues:  
 
• SBInet’s technology implementation;  
 
• SBInet’s infrastructure implementation;  
 
• the extent to which CBP has determined the impact of SBInet 
technology and infrastructure on its workforce needs and operating 
procedures; and  
 
• how the CBP SBI Program Management Office (PMO)1 has defined its 
human capital goals and the progress it has made to achieve these 
goals.  
 
                                                                                                                                    
1The SBInet PMO is part of the CBP SBI PMO.  The SBInet PMO is responsible for 
overseeing all SBInet activities; for acquisition and implementation, including establishing 
and meeting program goals, objectives, and schedules; for overseeing contractor 
performance; and for coordinating among DHS agencies. 
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To address these issues, we analyzed DHS documents, including program 
schedules and status reports, and workforce data. We interviewed DHS 
and CBP headquarters and field officials, including representatives of the 
SBInet PMO, Border Patrol, CBP Air and Marine, and the DHS Science and 
Technology Directorate. We also visited the Tucson and Yuma, Arizona 
Border Patrol sectors2—two sites where SBInet deployment was underway 
at the time of our review. We performed our work from April 2007 through 
October 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. (App. I provides a detailed discussion of our scope and 
methodology.) 
 
We also have work underway to review other components of the SBInet 
program.  Specifically, we are conducting work for the House Committee 
on Homeland Security to assess the development and deployment of 
SBInet’s command, control, and communications systems, and 
surveillance and detection systems and expect to issue a report next year.  
In addition, we are reviewing DHS’s use of performance-based services 
acquisition, an acquisition method structured around the results to be 
achieved instead of the manner by which the service should be performed.  
We expect to issue a report on this effort in January 2008. 
 
DHS has made some progress to implement the first segment of SBInet 
technology, Project 28—a $20 million project to secure 28 miles along the 
southwest border, but it has fallen behind its planned schedule.  Boeing—
the prime contractor that DHS selected to acquire, deploy, and sustain 
systems of new surveillance and communications technology across U.S. 
borders—delivered and deployed the system components (i.e., radars, 
sensors, computers) to the Project 28 site in the Tucson sector on 
schedule. However, Project 28 is incomplete more than 4 months after it 
was to become operational—at which point Border Patrol agents were to 
begin using SBInet technology to support their activities, and CBP was to 
begin its operational test and evaluation phase. According to CBP and 
Boeing officials, the delays are primarily attributed to software integration 
problems—such as long delays in radar information being displayed in 
command centers.  In September 2007, CBP officials told us that Boeing 
was making progress in correcting the system integration problems, but 
CBP was unable to provide us with a specific date on when Boeing would 
Summary 
                                                                                                                                    
2The U.S. Border Patrol has 20 sectors responsible for detecting, interdicting, and 
apprehending those who attempt illegal entry or smuggle people—including terrorists or 
contraband, including weapons of mass destruction—across U.S. borders between official 
ports of entry. 
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complete the necessary corrections to make Project 28 operational. CBP 
reports that it is in the early stages of planning for additional SBInet 
technology projects along the southwest border; however, Boeing’s delay 
in completing Project 28 has led CBP to extend timelines for deploying 
some technology projects scheduled for calendar years 2007 and 2008. 
CBP reports that it has taken steps to strengthen its contract management 
for this project.  
 
Deploying SBInet’s infrastructure along the southwest border is on 
schedule, but meeting the SBInet program’s goal to have 370 miles of 
pedestrian fence and 200 miles of vehicle barriers in place by December 
31, 2008, may prove challenging and more costly than planned.  CBP met 
its intermediate goal to deploy 70 miles of new fencing in fiscal year 2007 
and the average cost per mile was $2.9 million. The SBInet PMO estimates 
that deployment costs for remaining fencing will be similar to those thus 
far.  In the past, DHS has minimized infrastructure construction labor 
costs by using Border Patrol agents and Department of Defense (DOD) 
military personnel.  However, CBP officials report that they plan to use 
commercial labor for future fencing projects.  The additional cost of 
commercial labor and potential unforeseen increases in contract costs 
suggest future deployment could be more costly than planned.  Also, while 
deployment of tactical infrastructure is on schedule, CBP officials 
reported that meeting deadlines has been challenging because of factors 
the officials will continue to face, including conducting outreach 
necessary to address border-community resistance, identifying and 
completing steps necessary to comply with environmental regulations, and 
addressing difficulties in acquiring rights to border lands.   
 
The impact of SBInet on the Border Patrol’s workforce’s needs and 
operating procedures remains unclear because the SBInet technology is 
not fully identified or deployed. CBP officials expect the number of Border 
Patrol agents required to meet mission needs to change from the current 
projections, but until the system is fully deployed, the direction and 
magnitude of the change is unknown. In addition, for the Tucson sector, 
where Project 28 is being deployed, the Border Patrol is developing a plan 
on how to integrate SBInet into its operating procedures.  Moreover, the 
delays in deploying Project 28 will require revising the SBInet’s training 
curriculum, and trainers and operators will be retrained.  
The SBI PMO tripled in size in fiscal year 2007 but fell short of its staffing 
goal of 270 employees.  Agency officials expressed concerns that staffing 
shortfalls could affect the agency’s capacity to provide adequate 
contractor oversight. In addition, the SBI PMO has not yet completed its 
long-term human capital planning. 
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In their oral comments on a draft of this statement, DHS generally agreed 
with our findings and provided clarifying information that we incorporated 
as appropriate.   
 
The SBInet program is responsible for identifying and deploying an 
appropriate mix of technology (e.g., sensors, cameras, radars, 
communications systems, and mounted laptop computers for agent 
vehicles), tactical infrastructure (e.g., fencing, vehicle barriers, roads,), 
rapid response capability (e.g., ability to quickly relocate operational 
assets and personnel) and personnel (e.g., program staff and Border Patrol 
agents) that will enable CBP agents and officers to gain effective control3 
of U.S. borders.  SBInet technology is also intended to include the 
development and deployment of a common operating picture (COP) that 
provides uniform data through a command center environment to Border 
Patrol agents in the field and all DHS agencies and to be interoperable 
with stakeholders external to DHS, such as local law enforcement.  The 
initial focus of SBInet is on the southwest border areas between ports of 
entry4 that CBP has designated as having the highest need for enhanced 
border security because of serious vulnerabilities. Through SBInet, CBP 
plans to complete a minimum of 387 miles of technology deployment 
across the southwest border by December 31, 2008. Figure 1 shows the 







                                                                                                                                    
3DHS defines effective control of U.S. borders as the ability to consistently: (1) detect 
illegal entries into the United States; (2) identify and classify these entries to determine the 
level of threat involved; (3) respond to these entries; and (4) bring events to a satisfactory 
law enforcement resolution. 
4At a port of entry location, CBP officers secure the flow of people and cargo into and out 
of the country, while facilitating legitimate travel and trade.  
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Figure 1: Select SBInet Projects Under Way on the Southwest Border 
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In September 2006, CBP awarded a prime contract to the Boeing Company 
for 3 years, with three additional 1-year options. As the prime contractor, 
Boeing is responsible for acquiring, deploying, and sustaining selected 
SBInet technology and tactical infrastructure projects.  In this way, Boeing 
has extensive involvement in the SBInet program requirements 
development, design, production, integration, testing, and maintenance 
and support of SBInet projects. Moreover, Boeing is responsible for 
selecting and managing a team of subcontractors that provide individual 
components for Boeing to integrate into the SBInet system.5 The SBInet 
contract is largely performance-based—that is, CBP has set requirements 
for SBInet and Boeing and CBP coordinate and collaborate to develop 
solutions to meet these requirements—and designed to maximize the use 
of commercial off-the-shelf technology. 6  CBP’s SBInet PMO oversees and 
manages the Boeing-led SBInet contractor team. The SBInet PMO 
workforce includes a mix of government and contractor support staff. The 
SBInet PMO reports to the CBP SBI Program Executive Director.  
 
CBP is executing part of SBInet activities through a series of task orders to 
Boeing for individual projects. As of September 30, 2007, CBP had 
awarded five task orders to Boeing for SBInet projects.  These include task 
orders for (1) Project 28, Boeing’s pilot project and initial implementation 
of SBInet technology to achieve control of 28 miles of the border in the 
Tucson sector; (2) Project 37, for construction approximately 32 miles of 
vehicle barriers and pedestrian fencing in the Yuma sector along the Barry 
M. Goldwater Range (BMGR);7 (3) Program Management, for engineering, 
facilities and infrastructure, test and evaluation, and general program 
management services; (4) Fence Lab, a project to evaluate the 
performance and cost of deploying different types of fences and vehicle 
barriers; and (5) a design task order for developing the plans for several 
technology projects to be located in the Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso 
sectors.  
 
                                                                                                                                    
5Boeing employs several companies as subcontractors on the SBInet project. These 
companies provide Boeing with a variety of services. For example, Boeing has used a 
subcontractor to install laptops into CBP vehicles, while it has used another to develop and 
deploy mobile sensor towers. 
6Commercial off-the-shelf is a term for software or hardware, generally technology or 
computer products, that are available for sale, lease, or license to the general public. 
7Project 37 consists of three phases, which when complete are to provide control over 37 
miles of border in the Yuma sector. The first two phases focus on deployment of tactical 
infrastructure. The third phase will focus on technology systems.  
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In addition to deploying technology across the southwest border, the 
SBInet PMO plans to deploy 370 miles of single-layer pedestrian fencing 
and 200 miles of vehicle barriers by December 31, 2008.  Whereas 
pedestrian fencing is designed to prevent people on foot from crossing the 
border, vehicle barriers are other physical barriers meant to stop the entry 
of vehicles.  The SBInet PMO is utilizing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE) to contract for fencing and supporting infrastructure (such as 
lights and roads), complete required environmental assessments, and 
acquire necessary real estate.8
 
DHS has estimated that the total cost for completing the deployment for 
the southwest border—the initial focus of SBInet deployment—will be 
$7.6 billion from fiscal years 2007 through 2011. DHS has not yet reported 
the estimated life cycle cost for this program, which is the total cost to the 
government for a program over its full life, consisting of research and 
development, operations, maintenance, and disposal costs.9 For fiscal year 
2007, Congress appropriated about $1.2 billion for SBInet, about which 40 
percent DHS had committed or obligated as of September 30, 2007. For 
fiscal year 2008, DHS has requested an additional $1 billion.10
 
DHS has made some progress to implement Project 28—the first segment 
of technology on the southwest border, but it has fallen behind its planned 
schedule.  Project 28 is the first opportunity for Boeing to demonstrate 
that its technology system can meet SBInet performance requirements in a 
real-life environment.11 Boeing’s inability thus far to resolve system 
integration issues has left Project 28 incomplete more than 4 months after 
its planned June 13 milestone to become operational—at which point, 





                                                                                                                                    
8The SBInet PMO contracted with Boeing Company to construct 32 miles of fencing in the 
BMGR.  Deployment of this fencing has been completed, and the SBInet PMO plans to use 
USACE to contract for all remaining pedestrian fencing and vehicle barriers to be deployed 
through December 31, 2008.   
9GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Information for Supporting Key 
Decisions for Boost and Ascent Phase Elements, GAO-07-430 (Washington, D.C.: April 
2007).  
10DHS and DOD appropriations bills for fiscal year 2008 that include additional funding for 
border security are awaiting final action in Congress. 
11CBP has established performance requirements for SBInet technology. These include 
requirements for (1) probability of detection; (2) correctly identifying threats; (3) 
apprehension; (4) system availability; and (5) false alarm rate. 
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their activities, and CBP was to begin its operational test and evaluation 
phase.  Boeing delivered and deployed the individual technology 
components of Project 28 on schedule.12 Nevertheless, CBP and Boeing 
officials reported that Boeing has been unable to effectively integrate the 
information collected from several of the newly deployed technology 
components, such as sensor towers, cameras, radars, and unattended 
ground sensors. Among several technical problems reported were that it 
was taking too long for radar information to display in command centers 
and newly deployed radars were being activated by rain, making the 
system unusable. In August 2007, CBP officially notified Boeing that it 
would not accept Project 28 until these and other problems were 
corrected.  In September 2007, CBP officials told us that Boeing was 
making progress in correcting the system integration problems; however, 
CBP was unable to provide us with a specific date when Boeing would 
complete the corrections necessary to make Project 28 operational. See 
figures 2 and 3 below for photographs of SBInet technology along the 
southwest border. 
Figure 2: Project 28 Mobile Sensor Tower Deployed in Tucson Sector 
 
                                                                                                                                    
12Project 28 components include: 9 mobile radar/sensor towers; 4 underground sensors, 70 
small hand-held satellite phones for agents to communicate throughout the Tucson sector; 
and 50 CBP agent vehicles with secure-mounted laptop computers and communications 
capabilities. 
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Figure 3: At Left, Mounted Laptop Installed in Border Patrol Vehicle; at Right, 
Project 28 Command and Control Center 
 
The SBInet PMO reported that is in the early stages of planning for 
additional SBInet technology projects along the southwest border; 
however, Boeing’s delay in completing Project 28 has led the PMO to 
change the timeline for deploying some of these projects. In August 2007, 
SBInet PMO officials told us they were revising the SBInet implementation 
plan to delay interim project milestones for the first phase of SBInet 
technology projects, scheduled for calendar years 2007 and 2008.13 For 
example, SBInet PMO officials said they were delaying the start dates for 
two projects14 that were to be modeled on the design used for Project 28 
until after Project 28 is operational and can provide lessons learned for 
planning and deploying additional SBInet technology along the southwest 
border. According to the SBInet master schedule dated May 31, 2007, these 
projects were to become operational in December 2007 and May 2008. 
Despite these delays, SBInet PMO officials said they still expected to 
complete all of the first phase of technology projects by the end of 
calendar year 2008. As of October 15, 2007, the SBInet PMO had not 
provided us with a revised deployment schedule for this first phase. 
                                                                                                                                    
13The SBInet PMO plans to deploy SBInet projects in three phases. Phase one projects are 
scheduled between April 2007 and December 2008; phase two projects are scheduled 
between May 2008 and early 2010; and phase three projects are scheduled to begin in May 
2009. 
14The two projects are Project 37 BMGR phase three technology deployment, and the Texas 
Mobile System, technology deployment for about 70 miles of border in the El Paso sector. 
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CBP reports that it is taking steps to strengthen its contract management 
for Project 28. For example, citing numerous milestone slippages by 
Boeing during Project 28 implementation, in August 2007, CBP sought and 
reached an agreement with Boeing to give it greater influence in milestone 
setting and planning corrective actions on the Project 28 task order. While 
CBP had selected a firm-fixed-price contract to limit cost overruns on 
Project 28,15 CBP officials told us that the firm-fixed-price contract CBP 
used for Project 28 had limited the government’s role in directing Boeing 
in its decision making process. For example, CBP and contractor officials 
told us they expressed concern about the timeline for completing Project 
28, but CBP chose not to modify the contract because doing so would have 
made CBP responsible for costs beyond the $20 million fixed-price 
contract.16 In mid-August 2007, CBP organized a meeting with Boeing 
representatives to discuss ways to improve the collaborative process, the 
submission of milestones, and Boeing’s plan to correct Project 28 
problems. Following this meeting, CBP and Boeing initiated a Change 
Control Board.17 In mid-September representatives from Boeing’s SBInet 
team and its subcontractors continued to participate on this board and 
vote on key issues for solving Project 28 problems. Although CBP 
participates on this committee as a non-voting member, a senior SBInet 
official said the government’s experience on the Change Control Board 
had been positive thus far. For example, the official told us that the 
Change Control Board had helped improve coordination and integration 
with Boeing and for suggesting changes to the subcontractor companies 
working on Project 28. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
15A firm-fixed-price contract provides for a price that is not subject to any adjustment on 
the basis of the contractor’s cost experience in performing the contract. This contract type 
places maximum risk upon the contractor and full responsibility for all costs and resulting 
profit or loss.  
16In April 2007, CBP and Boeing reached an agreement to modify the terms of the Project 28 
contract, increasing it to about $20.66 million. CBP modified the contract to add several 
project design requirements that the existing task order did not address.  
17The Change Control Board is a voting body that represents the interests of program and 
project management by ensuring that a structured process is used to consider proposed 
changes and incorporate them into a specified release of a product. 
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Deploying SBInet’s tactical infrastructure along the southwest border is on 
schedule, but meeting the SBInet program’s goal to have 370 miles of 
pedestrian fence and 200 miles of vehicle barriers in place by December 
31, 2008, may be challenging and more costly than planned. CBP set an 
intermediate goal to deploy 70 miles of new pedestrian fencing by the 
close of fiscal year 2007 and, having deployed 73 miles by this date, 
achieved its goal. Table 1 summarizes CBP‘s progress and plans for 
tactical infrastructure deployment. 
SBInet Tactical 
Infrastructure 
Deployment on Track 
but May Be 
Challenging and More 
Costly than Planned 




















fencing 78 73 151 370 219 
Vehicle 
barriers 57 53 110 200 90 
Source: GAO analysis of CBP data. 
 
Costs for the 73 miles of fencing constructed in fiscal year 2007 averaged 
$2.9 million per mile and ranged from $700,000 in San Luis, Arizona, to $4.8 
million per mile in Sasabe, Arizona. CBP also deployed 11 miles of vehicle 
barriers and, although CBP has not yet been able to provide us with the 
cost of these vehicle barriers, it projects that the average per mile cost for 
the first 75 miles of barriers it deploys will be $1.5 million. Figure 4 
presents examples of fencing deployed. 
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Figure 4: At Left, SBInet Fencing Being Deployed at Sasabe, Arizona; at Right, 
SBInet Fencing Deployed at Yuma, Arizona 
 
CBP estimates costs for the deployment of fencing in the future will be 
similar to those thus far. However, according to CBP officials, costs vary 
due to the type of terrain, materials used, land acquisition, who performs 
the construction, and the need to meet an expedited schedule.  Although 
CBP estimates that the average cost of remaining fencing will be $2.8 
million per mile, actual future costs may be higher due to factors such as 
the greater cost of commercial labor, higher than expected property 
acquisition costs, and unforeseen costs associated with working in remote 
areas.  To minimize one of the many factors that add to cost, in the past 
DHS has used Border Patrol agents and DOD military personnel.  
However, CBP officials reported that they plan to use commercial labor 
for future infrastructure projects to meet their deadlines. Of the 73 miles 
of fencing completed to date, 31 were completed by DOD military 
personnel and 42 were constructed through commercial contracts.  While 
the non-commercial projects cost an average of $1.2 million per mile,18 the 
commercial projects averaged over three times more—$4 million.19 
                                                                                                                                    
18CBP’s estimates of non-commercial fencing projects do not include labor costs associated 
with using government personnel.  
19According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), DHS predicts that the San Diego 
fence will have a total cost of $127 million for its 14-mile length when it is completed— 
roughly $9 million a mile.  Construction of the first 9.5 miles of fencing cost $31 million, or 
roughly $3 million a mile, while construction of the last 4.5 miles of fencing is projected to 
cost $96 million, or roughly $21 million a mile.  DHS is proposing to hire private contractors 
to expedite the construction of the remaining 4.5 miles of fencing; according to CRS this 
fact, and the complexity of the construction, may account for part of the difference in cost. 
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According to CBP officials, CBP plans to utilize exclusively commercial 
contracts to complete the remaining 219 miles of fencing. If contract costs 
for deployment of remaining miles are consistent with those to deploy 
tactical infrastructure to date and average $4 million per mile, the total 
contract cost will be $890 million, considerably more than CBP’s initial 
estimate of $650 million.   
 
Although deployment of tactical infrastructure is on schedule, CBP 
officials reported that meeting deadlines has been challenging because 
factors they will continue to face include conducting outreach necessary 
to address border community resistance, devoting time to identify and 
complete steps necessary to comply with environmental regulations,20 and 
addressing difficulties in acquiring rights to border lands. As of July 2007 
CBP anticipated community resistance to deployment for 130 of its 370 
miles of fencing.  According to community leaders, communities resist 
fencing deployment for reasons including the adverse effect they 
anticipate it will have on cross-border commerce and community unity. In 
addition to consuming time, complying with environmental regulations, 
and acquiring rights to border land can also drive up costs.  Although CBP 
officials state that they are proactively addressing these challenges, these 
factors will continue to pose a risk to meeting deployment targets. 
 
In an effort to identify low cost and easily deployable fencing solutions, 
CBP funded a project called Fence Lab. CBP plans to try to contain costs 
by utilizing the results of Fence Lab in the future.  Fence Lab tested nine 
fence/barrier prototypes and evaluated them based on performance 
criteria such as their ability to disable a vehicle traveling at 40 miles per 
hour (see fig. 5), allowing animals to migrate through them, and their cost-
effectiveness.  Based on the results from the lab, SBInet has developed 
three types of vehicle barriers and one pedestrian fence that meet CBP 
operational requirements (see fig. 6).  The pedestrian fence can be 
installed onto two of these vehicle barriers to create a hybrid pedestrian 
fence and vehicle barrier.  CBP plans to include these solutions in a 
                                                                                                                                    
20Although the REAL ID Act of 2005 gives DHS the authority to waive all legal requirements 
necessary to ensure expeditious construction of certain specified barriers and roads along 
the southern border (Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, § 102, 119 Stat. 302, 306), DHS officials told 
us that they only use this authority after they have pursued alternatives. 
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“toolkit” of approved fences and barriers,21 and plans to deploy solutions 
from this toolkit for all remaining vehicle barriers and for 202 of 225 miles 
of remaining fencing.  Further, CBP officials anticipate that deploying 
these solutions will reduce costs because cost-effectiveness was a 
criterion for their inclusion in the toolkit.  SBInet officials also told us that 
widely deploying a select set of vehicle barriers and fences will lower 
costs through enabling it to make bulk purchases of construction and 
maintenance materials. 
Figure 5: Fence Lab crash testing conducted in May 2007 
 
                                                                                                                                    
21 As the SBInet PMO uses testing and evaluation to identify tactical infrastructure and 
technology components that effectively secure the border, the SBInet PMO is approving 
them for inclusion in a master “toolkit” of approved solutions.  In addition to vehicle 
barriers and fences, the toolkit will include technology components such as radars and 
satellite phones as well as a list of approved vendors.  In the future, the SBInet PMO plans 
to choose among its toolkit components to craft border security solutions. 
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Figure 6: Vehicle Barriers and Fencing Developed by Fence Lab That Meet 
Performance Requirements and Are Included in SBInet’s “Toolbox” of Approved 
Fences and Barriers. 
 
 
While SBInet Program officials expect SBInet to greatly reduce the time 
spent by CBP enforcement personnel in performing detection activities,22 a 
full evaluation of SBInet’s impact on the Border Patrol’s workforce needs 
has not been completed. The Border Patrol currently uses a mix of 
resources including personnel, technology, infrastructure, and rapid 
response capabilities to incrementally achieve its strategic goal of 
establishing and maintaining operational control of the border. 23 Each year 
through its Operational Requirements Based Budget Program (ORBBP), 
the Border Patrol sectors outline the amount of resources needed to 
SBInet Impact on 
Border Patrol’s 
Workforce Needs and 
Operating Procedures 
Remains Unclear 
                                                                                                                                    
22SBI PMO expects SBInet to provide the capability to predict, deter, detect, identify, 
classify, track, respond to, and resolve border incursion; and the operational enhancements 
of SBInet will provide efficiencies by reducing the time agents spend performing detection 
and characterization activities.  
23CBP defines operational control as the ability to detect, respond, and interdict border 
penetrations in areas deemed as high priority for threat potential or other national security 
objectives.  
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achieve a desired level of border control.24 Border Patrol officials state this 
annual planning process allows the organization to measure the impact of 
each type of resource on the required number of Border Patrol agents. A 
full evaluation of SBInet’s impact on the Border Patrol’s workforce needs 
is not yet included in the ORBBP process; however, the Border Patrol 
plans to incorporate information from Project 28 a few months after it is 
operational.   
 
According to agency officials, CBP is on track to meet its hiring goal of 
6,000 new Border Patrol agents by December 2008, but after SBInet is 
deployed, CBP officials expect the number of Border Patrol agents 
required to meet mission needs to change from current projections, 
although the direction and magnitude of the change is unknown. In 
addition, in June 2007, we expressed concern that deploying these new 
agents to the southwest sectors coupled with the planned transfer of more 
experienced agents to the northern border will create a disproportionate 
ratio of new agents to supervisors within those sectors—jeopardizing the 
supervisors’ availability to acclimate new agents.25  Tucson Sector officials 
stated CBP is planning to hire from 650 to 700 supervisors next year. To 
accommodate the additional agents, the Border Patrol has taken initial 
steps to provide additional work space through constructing temporary 
and permanent facilities, at a projected cost of about $550 million from 
fiscal year 2007 to 2011. 
 
The SBInet PMO expects SBInet to support day-to-day border enforcement 
operations; however, analysis of the impact of SBInet technology on the 
Border Patrol’s operational procedures cannot be completed at this time 
because agents have not been able to fully use the system as intended. 
Leveraging technology is part of the National Border Patrol Strategy which 
identifies the objectives, tools, and initiatives the Border Patrol uses to 
maintain operational control of the borders. The Tucson sector, where 
Project 28 is being deployed, is developing a plan on how to integrate 
SBInet into its operating procedures. Border Patrol officials stated they 
intend to re-evaluate this strategy, as SBInet technology is identified and 
deployed, and as control of the border is achieved. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
24The Border Patrol defines five levels of border security ranging from “controlled”—the 
highest sustainable level of control to “remote/low activity”—the lowest level of control. 
25GAO, Border Patrol Costs and Challenges Related to Training New Agents, GAO-07-997T 
(Washington, D.C.: June 2007).  
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According to agency officials, 22 trainers and 333 operators were trained 
on the current Project 28 system, but because of deployment delays and 
changes to the COP software, the SBInet training curriculum is to be 
revised by Boeing and the government.  Training is continuing during this 
revision process with 24 operators being trained each week.  According to 
CBP officials, Border Patrol agents are receiving “hands on” training 
during evening and weekend shifts at the COP workstations to familiarize 
themselves with the recent changes made to the Project 28 system.  
However, training is to be stopped once a stabilized version of the COP 
can be used and both trainers and operators are to be retrained using the 
revised curriculum.  Costs associated with revising the training material 
and retraining the agents are to be covered by Boeing as part of the 
Project 28 task order; however, the government may incur indirect costs 
associated with taking agents offline for retraining. 
 
The SBI PMO tripled in size in fiscal year 2007 but fell short of its staffing 
goal of 270 employees.26  As of September 30, 2007, the SBI PMO had 247 
employees onboard, with 113 government employees and 134 contractor 
support staff.  SBI PMO officials also reported that as of October 19, 2007, 
they had 76 additional staff awaiting background investigations.  In 
addition, these officials said that a Human Capital Management Plan has 
been drafted, but as of October 22, 2007, the plan had not been approved. 
In February 2007, we reported that SBInet officials had planned to finalize 
a human capital strategy that was to include details on staffing and 
expertise needed for the program.27 At that time, SBI and SBInet officials 
expressed concern about difficulties in finding an adequate number of 
staff with the required expertise to support planned activities about 
staffing that shortfalls could limit government oversight efforts. Strategic 
human capital planning is a key component used to define the critical 
skills and competencies that will be needed to achieve programmatic goals 
and outlines ways the organization can fill gaps in knowledge, skills, and 
abilities.28 Until SBInet fully implements a comprehensive human capital 
SBI PMO Did Not 
Meet All of Its Staffing 




                                                                                                                                    
26GAO, SBInet Expenditure Plan Needs to Better Support Oversight and Accountability, 
GAO-07-309 (Washington, D.C.: February 2007). 
27GAO-07-309. 
28See GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning, 
GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: December 2003) and GAO, Framework for Accessing the 
Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies GAO-05-218G (Washington, D.C.: September 
2005). 
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strategy, it will continue to risk not having staff with the right skills and 
abilities to successfully execute the program. 
 
Project 28 and other early technology and infrastructure projects are the 
first steps on a long journey towards SBInet implementation that will 
ultimately require an investment of billions of taxpayer dollars.  Some of 
these early projects have encountered unforeseen problems that could 
affect DHS’s ability to meet projected completion dates, expected costs, 
and performance goals. These issues underscore the need for both DHS 
and Boeing, as the prime contractor, to continue to work cooperatively to 
correct the problems remaining with Project 28 and to ensure that the 
SBInet PMO has adequate staff to effectively plan and oversee future 
projects.  These issues also underscore Congress’s need to stay closely 
attuned to DHS’s progress in the SBInet program to make sure that 
performance, schedule, and cost estimates are achieved and the nation’s 
border security needs are fully addressed. 
 
This concludes my prepared testimony. I would be happy to respond to 
any questions that members of the Subcommittees may have. 
 
For questions regarding this testimony, please call Richard M. Stana at 
(202) 512-8777 or StanaR@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this 
statement were Robert E. White, Assistant Director; Rachel Beers; Jason 
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Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
To determine the progress that the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) has made in implementing the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) 
SBInet’s technology deployment projects, we analyzed DHS 
documentation, including program schedules, project task orders, status 
reports, and expenditures. We also interviewed DHS and the U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP) headquarters and field officials, including 
representatives of the SBInet Program Management Office (PMO), Border 
Patrol, CBP Air and Marine, and the DHS Science and Technology 
Directorate, as well as SBInet contractors. We visited the Tucson Border 
Patrol sector—the site where SBInet technology deployment was 
underway at the time of our review. 
To determine the progress that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
has made in infrastructure project implementation, we analyzed DHS 
documentation, including schedules, contracts, status reports, and 
expenditures. In addition, we interviewed DHS and CBP headquarters and 
field officials, including representatives of the SBInet PMO, and Border 
Patrol. We also interviewed officials from the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers and the Department of the Interior. We visited the Tucson and 
Yuma, Arizona Border Patrol sectors—two sites where tactical 
infrastructure projects were underway at the time of our review. We did 
not review the justification for infrastructure project cost estimates or 
independently verify the source or validity of the cost information. 
To determine the extent to which CBP has determined the impact of 
SBInet technology and infrastructure on its workforce needs and 
operating procedures, we reviewed documentation of the agency’s 
decision to hire an additional 6,000 agents and the progress hiring these 
agents.  We also interviewed headquarters and field officials to track if and 
how CBP (1) is hiring and training its target number of personnel, (2) it is 
planning to train new agents on SBInet technology, and (3) it will 
incorporate the new system into its operational procedures, and any 
implementation challenges it reports facing in conducting this effort. 
To determine how the SBInet PMO defined its human capital goals and 
progress it has made in achieving these goals, we reviewed the office’s 
documentation on its hiring efforts related to SBInet, related timelines, 
and compared this information with agency goals. We determined that the 
workforce data were sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report. We 
also interviewed SBI and SBInet officials to identify challenges in meeting 
the goals and steps taken by the agency to address those challenges. 
 
Appendix I: Scope and 
Methodology 
 
We performed our work from April 2007 through October 2007 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
(440584) 
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